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 In this minor dissertation, the use and choice of weapons employed during the 
armed conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 over South Ossetia will be 
analysed. Due to the fact that cluster munitions were used by both parties, and that 
they are a controversial weapon with regard the principles regulating the use and 
choice of weapons, section I of this dissertation will focus on them and their 
regulation in international law. Section II will focus on the facts concerning the 2008 
conflict over and South Ossetia. Section III will look at the international humanitarian 
laws applicable and relevant to this dissertation. In sections IV, V, and VI arguments 
will be raised in order to attribute violations of international humanitarian law to 
Georgia, while countering foreseeable arguments which could be invoked against 
Russia. This dissertation will therefore only analyse the provisions when they are 
pertinent to that aim. The desired outcome of proceeding in such a manner is that 
since both the viewpoints of the claimant and the defendant will be analysed, an 
extended and well-rounded view on the law, its interpretation, controversies, opinions 
of established scholars and jurisprudence, will be given. The relevant principles 
relating to the use and choice of weapons which will be analysed are: the principle of 
discrimination (section IV), the principle of proportionality (section V), as well as the 
prohibition to cause superfluous harm (section VI). Certain specific issues such as 
human shields will also be looked at in the analysis of a particular attack. In the 
analysis of this conflict, both well-established arguments, as well as controversial or 
disputed ones, will be presented in order to support either side. This analysis will 
argue that Georgia violated international humanitarian law, while defending Russia’s 
conduct, however, the arguments presented will remain coherent and not contradict 
each other. This paper’s scope will be limited to analysing attacks which are 
sufficiently documented and imply a problem of use and choice of weapons; as 
opposed to the ones which solely purport an issue of military objective and were hit 
by a precise missile. Indeed, this dissertation focuses more on controversial weapons 
and whether they violate international humanitarian law solely by their inherent 
nature, that is, the mere choice of using them would be in violation of the law; or by 
their specific use in the attack. The four attacks analysed will allow an in depth 





dissertation will therefore be limited to them and any further attack which do not 
bring to light any new arguments will not be investigated. The attacks which will be 
examined in the context of the conflict over South Ossetia occurred both in South 
Ossetia as well as non-disputed Georgian territory. These are: the one launched by 
Georgia using BM-21 Grads multiple rocket launchers on Tskhinvali and surrounding 
villages lasting from the night of the 7th of August until some point during the day of 
the 8th of August;1 the 9th of August attack where Georgia employed Mk-4 cluster 
munition rockets containing M85 submunitions over Gori district villages, the Roki 
tunnel and according to a witness, Dzara Road2; Russia’s attack on Gori city on the 
12th of August using an Iskander-M SS-26 cluster munition missile;3 as well as the 
firing of a few missiles on a school in Gori city by the Russian air force on the 9th of 
August.4 The entirety of the facts pertaining to the conflict are drawn from the report 
on the conflict carried out by Human Rights Watch entitled ‘Up in Flames’.5 The 
analysis of the relevant provisions will proceed as follows: the rules will be analysed 
one by one, following the general introduction to the rule, general statements 
regarding its interpretation and application, the law will then be applied to the 
different attacks, given that enough facts are provided and that it pertains to the aim 
of the dissertation. If there are specific interpretations or applications of the law 




SECTION I: CLUSTER MUNITION WEAPONS AND THEIR REGULATION 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 This section will be developed in four parts. Firstly, the definition of cluster 
munitions, as well as their history and development will be discussed. Secondly, a 
few arguments militated by experts opposing a cluster munitions ban will be exposed. 
                                                
1 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the 
Conflict over South Ossetia (2009) (hereafter ‘Human Rights Watch Up in Flames’) 23, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/georgia0109web.pdf, accessed on 10 December 2015. 
2 Ibid at 64-65. 
3 Ibid at 104. 






Thirdly, the different rules restricting and prohibiting the use of cluster munitions 
which exist alongside the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 30 May 2008, will be 
examined. Fourthly, this dissertation will look at the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, the process it took for it to come to light, as well as its progress. Lastly, a 
brief overview of the international prosecution of countries and individuals using 
cluster munitions will be given. 
 
 
A.  Cluster munitions, their history and their development 
 
 Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is defined as 
‘a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive 
submunitions, each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive 
submunitions’.6 Different kinds of cluster munition weapons exist with different areas 
of impact and levels of precision. Cluster munitions were introduced in order to cope 
with new technologies in a way which would improve military efficacy without 
putting in peril the life of the military force handling the weapon.7 In the Vietnam 
War, they were used in order to deal with the newly employed surface-to-air missiles 
and anti-aircraft artillery.8 Due to new advances in military technology, aircraft had 
difficulty neutralising ‘air defences from altitudes that allowed using single bombs 
accurately and effectively.’9 Cluster munitions provided them with the solution, 
allowing them to attack a certain area with a multitude of bomblets without having 
the need to succumb to the dangers of flying at low altitudes, or having to fly over the 
same target numerous times.10 Cluster bomb technology progressed with the years, 
and by the mid-1960s submunitions were more accurate and could be delivered using 
artillery and surface-to-surface missiles.11 The precision guided munitions which 
nowadays characterise most cluster munitions have increased the accuracy of the 
                                                
6 Article 2(2) Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
7 E Prokosch The Technology of Killing: A Military and Political History of Anti-Personnel Weapons 
(1995) 83-84. 
8 TJ Herthel ‘On the chopping block: Cluster munitions and the law of war’ (2001) 51 Air Force Law 
Review 236-37. 
9 Ibid at 237. 
10 Prokosch op cit (n7) 83-84. 





bombing and its effectiveness.12 ‘Proliferation of cluster bomb technology was 
incremental following the conflict in Vietnam’,13 their numbers grew exponentially 
and by 1996 at least 24 countries were producers or users of cluster munitions.14 
According to experts, ‘[t]his recent growth [in production and usage] reflects cluster 
munitions' effectiveness on the modern battlefield.’15 However, the extensive use of 
cluster munitions in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm in Iraq and Kuwait, as well as 
in the 1999 Operation Allied Force, with the involvement of NATO, created 
momentum for the campaign to ban or regulate cluster bombs.16 The arguments 
brought forth were that they violate international humanitarian law - in particular the 
principles of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and the prohibition to cause 
superfluous harm.17  
 
 
B.  Arguments supporting the legality of cluster munitions  
 
 As this dissertation will analyse at length the problems inherent in cluster 
munitions, it is worth noting arguments which experts opposed to a restriction on 
cluster munitions have put forward. Firstly, according to them, ‘banning cluster 
munitions would require the military to use more high explosive ordnance to 
accomplish the same results over a wide area, potentially causing more damage and 
suffering than typically done by cluster bombs’18 and ‘creating the increased 
possibility of a weapon missing its target and causing unintended collateral 
damage.’19 Cluster munitions could thus reduce civilian collateral damage and loss. 
Secondly, ‘several types of other weapons have fragmentation effects, such as 
artillery shells, aircraft bombs, landmines, and hand grenades, and that the military 
needs these types of weapons, including cluster bombs, for defensive operations to 
                                                
12 MO Lacey ‘Cluster munitions: Wonder weapon or humanitarian horror?’ (2009) 2009 The Army 
Lawyer 29. 
13 Prokosch op cit (n7) 177-178. 
14 Herthel op cit (n8) 238. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid at 239. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid at 251. 





cover large areas and for attacking anti-aircraft emplacements.’20 Lastly, they contend 
that ‘controlled cluster munitions caused less suffering than did random 
fragmentation weapons.’21  
 
 
C.  Rules regulating Cluster Munitions 
 
 The conduct of military operations is governed by international humanitarian 
law. A cardinal principle underlying this body of law is that the right of the 
belligerent to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.22 Accordingly, 
‘[h]arm to the enemy must be limited to what is militarily necessary’.23 From this rule 
stems two other fundamental principles: the prohibition of indiscriminate means and 
methods of warfare, and the prohibition to choose a weapon or use it in a way which 
causes superfluous harm or uselessly aggravates suffering.24 The former is aimed at 
the protection of civilians and stipulates that ‘[s]tates must never make civilians the 
object of attack’ and consequently that ‘weapons that are incapable of distinguishing 
between civilian and military targets’ are prohibited.25 In 1868, before the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions, the Saint Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time 
of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight of 11 December 1868 
condemned the use of weapons ‘which uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled 
men or make their death inevitable’. This Declaration was the first ‘formal agreement 
prohibiting the use of certain weapons in war.’26 This prohibition was codified in the 
Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 
190727 and in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 
                                                
20 Herthel op cit (n8) 252. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Article 22 Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 
1907 (hereafter Hague Regulations). 
23 G Werle Principles of International Criminal Law 2ed (2009) 426.  
24 M Sassòli, AA Bouvier & A Quintin How Does Law Protect in War? Volume 1: Outline of 
International Humanitarian Law 3ed (2011) part 1 chap 9 at 33. 
25 International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons (8 July 1996) at para 78. 
26 International Committee of the Red Cross, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/130?OpenDocument, accessed on 25 August 2015. 





1977 (hereafter Protocol 1).28 This Protocol also prohibits certain weapons which are 
inherently disproportionate,29 and the indiscriminate or disproportionate use of 
otherwise ‘permitted’ weapons.30 It is crucial to note that ‘these fundamental rules are 
to be observed by all [s]tates whether or not they have ratified the conventions that 
contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international 
customary law.31 Additionally, for cases not covered by the texts of international 
humanitarian law, ‘civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from 
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.’32 This last 
statement is referred to as the Martens Clause and ‘has proved to be an effective 
means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology.’33 These rules, 
accompanied by the Martens Clause, have proved efficient in the prohibition of 
certain weapons and their use, but nonetheless ‘the appearance of new means of 
combat has - without calling into question the longstanding principles and rules of 
international law - rendered necessary some specific prohibitions of the use of certain 
weapons’.34 These particular weapons consequently had specific conventions tailored 
around their prohibition and regulation. Such weapons include chemical and 
bacteriological weapons,35 certain types of mines, booby traps and other similar 
devices,36 weapons generating fragments which are not detectable by X-Ray,37 
incendiary weapons,38 blinding laser weapons,39 and cluster munitions.40 These 
prohibitions were all founded on principles of international humanitarian law, such as 
                                                
28 Article 35(2) Protocol 1. 
29 Article 51(4)(b) Protocol 1. 
30 Article 51(4)(a) and (b), art 51(5)(a) and (b), and art 57(2)(a)(ii) Protocol 1. 
31 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons supra (n25) at para 79. 
32 Article 1(2) Protocol 1.  
33 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons supra (n25) at para 78. 
34 Ibid para 76.  
35 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925. 
36 Protocol II of 10 October 1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps 
and Other Devices to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980 (hereafter Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons). 
37 Protocol I of 10 October 1980 on Non-Detectable Fragments to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons. 
38 Protocol III of 10 October 1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons to 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
39 Protocol IV of 13 October 1995 on Blinding Laser Weapons to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons. 





the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, the prohibition of causing superfluous harm, 
and the principle of proportionality.41 Even though these Conventions prohibiting 
specific weapons exist, the customary status of these principles remains crucial for 
two reasons. Firstly, not all states are parties to these conventions. Secondly, not all 
weapons which run a high risk of, or inherently do, violate these principles, are the 
subject of regulation. Therefore, the customary principles of international 
humanitarian law mentioned above will still apply in order to either prohibit certain 
weapons, or to limit their use. Nonetheless, controversies and debates still exist 
concerning certain weapons and whether they inherently violate these norms. Their 
explicit prohibition or restriction is therefore preferable.  
 
 
D.  The Convention on Cluster Munitions 
 
 Prior to the establishment of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, several 
unsuccessful attempts had been made in order to address the problem of cluster 
munitions.42 During each of these attempts, states opted against imposing such 
restrictions, due to the inability to reach a consensus.43 By way of example, in the 
1974 Lucerne Conference concerning the formulation of the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, cluster munition weapons were examined but purposely left 
out of the convention, remaining unregulated.44 In the 1976 Lugano Conference, 
which similarly regarded the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, little 
agreement on the issue could be found, and once more, proposals to outlaw cluster 
munitions failed.45 Additionally, the signatories of the Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices to the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons purposely excluded cluster munitions from its 
scope.46 The Ottawa treaty of 18 September 1997 concerning landmines also defined 
                                                
41 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons supra (n25) at para 78.  









landmines in a way to exclude cluster munitions from the definition.47 The attack by 
NATO in the Operation Allied Forces of 1999 led to another attempt at banning 
cluster munitions through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.48 While 
not completely unsuccessful, as it resulted in Protocol 5 on Explosive Remnants of 
War of 28 November 2003, which focuses on post conflict requirements, this 
Protocol left the use of cluster munitions in attacks un-regulated. However, in terms 
of the regulation concerning the after-effects of cluster munitions, this Protocol has 
the same outcome as the Convention on Cluster Munitions.49 
 
 In 2006, the atrocities of the Lebanon War resulted in a ‘real catalyst for the 
renewed emphasis to ban [cluster munitions].’50  This led to the last unsuccessful 
attempt by NGOs and states (lead by Norway) to ban cluster munitions through a new 
protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in November 2006.51 
Once again, due to the objections of the major military powers blocking the process, 
the protocol did not see the light of day.52 Anticipating this blockage and slow 
process, Norway declared its intention to organise a conference to ban cluster 
munitions outside of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.53 This 
conference was held in Oslo on the 22nd of February 2007 and led to the ‘Oslo 
Declaration of 23 February 2007’ where 46 nations, albeit excluding the ones most 
concerned, committed themselves to concluding a legally binding international 
instrument which prohibits the use and stockpiling of cluster munitions, by 2008. 
Eventually, the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster 
Munitions succeeded in creating a Convention prohibiting the use of cluster 
munitions for the parties having ratified it. The formal adoption of the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions occurred on the 30th of May 2008 in Dublin, and it came into 
force the 1st of August 2010. In the context of this dissertation, it is worth mentioning 
that Human Rights Watch attributes, to some degree, the large number of state 
                                                
47 Article 2 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 18 September 1997. 
48 E Agin ‘Cluster Munitions: Recent Developments’ (2013) 215 Military Law Review 115. 
49 DJ Raccuia ‘The Convention on Cluster Munitions: An incomplete solution to the cluster munition 
problem’ (2011) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 485. 
50 Lacey op cit (n12) 29. 
51 Agin op cit (n48) 116. 
52 Ibid. 
53 L Maresca ‘Introductory note to the Convention on Cluster Munitions’ (2009) 48 International 





signatories54 to this Convention in December 2008 as a reaction to the use and impact 
of cluster munitions on civilians in the 2008 conflict over South Ossetia.55 
 
 The Convention on Cluster Munitions’s objective is to prohibit, restrict or 
suspend the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions, while also 
prohibiting the state parties from assisting, encouraging or inducing other states or 
individuals to act in a way which is prohibited by the treaty.56 This prohibition binds 
the state even when it is engaging with a state not party to this convention which 
itself might be using cluster munitions.57 Worth acknowledging is that this 
Convention is hindered by the fact that it is not customary international law.58 Thus, 
there exists no customary ban on the use of cluster munitions.59 This is due to a few 
factors. Firstly, only practices followed from a sense of legal obligation can count in 
establishing rules of a customary status.60 The non-usage of a weapon can 
consequently only be taken into consideration if the state willingly abstained from 
using it in order to respect international humanitarian law, and not simply because 
circumstances calling for their use never arose.61 Secondly, and perhaps the most 
persuasive argument in this case, key users and producers of cluster munitions, 
including Russia, China, the United States of America, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil as well 
as India do not agree on the ban.62 Indeed, for a rule to become customary, state 
practice must include the one’s of states whose interests are particularly affected.63 
Furthermore, the refusal by these states to ratify the treaty is an exceedingly large 
drawback to the success of the Convention, as it has been advanced that ‘unless you 
get all the major producers and users of these weapons to agree on how they're going 
to regulate them, you're not going to meet your goal of addressing [their] 
humanitarian impact’.64 Adding to the hindrance of its success, approximately 50 per 
                                                
54 94 States. 
55 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1) 3. 
56 Article 1(1) Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
57 Article 21(3) cum art 21(4)(c) Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
58 Herthel op cit (n8) 269. 
59 Ibid. 
60 TW Bennett & J Strug Introduction to International Law (2013) 14. 
61 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons supra (n25) at para 67. 
62 Lacey op cit (n12) 31. 
63 ICJ North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (20 February 1969) at para 73. 
64 SD Mull, Acting Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, On-the-record-briefing on U.S. 
Cluster Munition Policy, Washington D.C. (21 May 2008), transcript available at http://2001-





cent of countries have not signed this Convention.65 Nonetheless, it can still be 
considered an achievement towards the prohibition of cluster munitions, as it has, to 
date, already been ratified by 98 states.66 
 
 
E.  International prosecution of the use of cluster munitions 
 
 Both individuals and states have been successfully prosecuted by international 
tribunals for their use of cluster munitions in a way not compatible with international 
humanitarian law.67 However, these tribunals have not claimed that choosing to use 
cluster munitions violates international humanitarian law per se.68 Furthermore, in the 
same way the Convention on Cluster Munition suffers from a lack of participation of 
crucial players in the field of cluster munitions, these same states have not accepted 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (hereafter ICC).69 
 
 
SECTION II:  FACTS 
 
 South Ossetia is and has been a disputed region bordering Russia. It is 
regarded by the international community as an autonomous breakaway region, but 
nevertheless de jure region of Georgia,70 even though its declared statehood has been 
recognised by a few states (Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Russia (after the 2008 
conflict)).71 Since this dissertation focuses on the use and choice of weapons by 
Georgia and Russia, without a particular focus on the statehood or legal status of 
                                                
65 Raccuia op cit (n49) 479. 
66 The United Nations Office at Geneva, available at 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/67DC5063EB530E02C12574F8002E9E49?Ope
nDocument, accessed on 23 January 2016. 
67 Raccuia op cit (n49) 473; for example: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(hereafter ICTY) Prosecutor v Milan Martić, Trial Chamber I (12 June 2007) at para 478; ICTY 
Prosecutor v Stanislav Galić, Trial Chamber I (5 December 2003) at para 751. 
68 Raccuia op cit (n49) 473. 
69 ICC, available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20sta
tute.aspx, accessed on 23 January 2016. 
70 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1) 2 and 9. 
71 Oxford Public International Law, available at 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2068, accessed 





South Ossetia, this dissertation will not go into further detail concerning this dispute. 
Furthermore, its legal classification, for reasons established in section III.D, would 
not change the conclusions that will be made. 
 
 The armed conflict was the result of years of escalating tensions between 
Russia, Georgia and South Ossetian forces.72 South Ossetia’s struggle for 
independence and statehood, combined with Georgia’s attempts at restoring Georgian 
territorial integrity caused tensions73. These were felt not only between different 
ethnic groups, but also between South Ossetian separatists, Georgian forces, and 
Russian forces, who considered themselves the guarantors of stability in the region.74 
 
 Adding to the already bleak conditions, the emergence of two competing 
governments in South Ossetia, comprised of the secessionist de facto government and 
a pro-Tbilisi government, created difficulties.75 This separated even further the ethnic 
Georgians from the rest and created an ever-increasing tangible tension and 
instability in South Ossetia.76 Tensions rose in September 2006 when Russia, in 
response to the detention by Georgia of four alleged Russian spies, halted all air, land 
and sea traffic with Georgia and expelled more than 2300 Georgians from Russia.77 
Furthermore, in 2008 Georgia’s efforts to join NATO angered Russia which triggered 
it to ‘deepen its cooperation with the breakaway administration in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.’78 The sum of the above resulted in increased hostility, regardless of 
the presence of peacekeeping forces present in South Ossetia.79 
 
 In July 2008, the situation had climaxed within South Ossetia. Georgian and 
South Ossetian forces were engaged in brutal artillery attacks.80 Furthermore, military 
exercises conducted by Russia and Georgia, as well as Russia’s involvement by 
conducting overflights over Tskhinvali in violation of Georgia’s airspace, intensified 
                                                
72 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1) 5. 
73 Ibid at 17-18. 
74 Ibid at 20. 
75 Ibid at 19. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid at 20. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid at 23. 





the animosity.81 By the end of July, Georgian and South Ossetian forces had engaged  
in more frequent and violent fights.82 Throughout the few days preceding the armed 
conflict, both sides exchanged fire, causing no casualties, but by the morning of the 
armed conflict, there were 12000 members of the Georgian armed forces and 75 
Georgian tanks gathered close to the South Ossetian border.83 
 
 The 2008 armed conflict was initiated on the 7th of August by Georgia’s 
artillery assault in Tskhinvali and other surrounding villages in South Ossetia.84 This 
was followed by attacks from Georgia’s ground and air forces, by using, among other 
means of warfare, BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers.85 The next day, alongside 
the continuation of the shelling, Georgian troops, as well as Russian troops (without 
the consent of Georgia),86 advanced towards Tskhinvali and other towns in South 
Ossetia, where, despite the fighting with South Ossetian militias, Georgian forces 
took control.87 From the 8th of August until the 12th, Russian air and ground forces hit 
several targets in South Ossetia, and different parts of undisputed Georgia territory, 
such as Gori city, Gori district and Tbilisi.88 During those attacks, a school in Gori 
city was hit on the 9th of August.89 Eventually, Russia deployed its army in the 
outskirts of Tskhinvali.90 Its fire, combined with that of the South Ossetian forces, 
forced the Georgian Defense Minister, on the 10th of August, to order his troops to 
withdraw from Tskhinvali and retreat to Gori city.91 On the 12th of August, Russia 
moved towards Gori city and eventually occupied it, as well as other strategic towns 
around it.92  
 
 At some stage in the armed conflict, both Georgia and Russia used cluster 
munitions.93 Georgia used M85 submunitions carried by Mk-4 rockets and fired from 
                                                
81 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1) 21. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid at 22. 
84 Ibid at 5. 
85 Ibid at 5 and 21. 
86 Ibid at 9. 
87 Ibid at 23. 
88 Ibid at 24. 
89 Ibid at 24 and 94. 
90 Ibid at 24. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid at 25. 





a Gradlar 160 multiple rocket launcher, on the 9th of August, on nine villages in 
undisputed Georgian territory, as well as towards the Roki tunnel and possibly Dzara 
road.94 As for Russia, during its attack on the 12th of August on Gori city, a town in 
undisputed Georgian territory, it used an Iskander SS-26 cluster munition missile, 
with an unknown type of submunitions.95 
 
 The armed conflict concluded on the 16th of August, after a ceasefire was 
declared, with ‘Georgian forces in retreat and Russian forces occupying South 
Ossetia and, temporarily, undisputed parts of Georgia.’96 Russian troops withdrew 
from the latter, including Gori, by the end of August.97 This conflict caused the death 
of hundreds of civilians, the displacement of tens of thousands, and significantly 
damaged civilian property.98 Furthermore, South Ossetian forces attempted to 
ethnically cleanse ethnic villages in undisputed Georgian territory by systematically 
destroying, pillaging and burning these villages.99 They also killed, raped, tortured, 
and injured ethnic Georgian civilians and detained them in inhumane and degrading 
conditions, forcing the ones who remained to leave and never return.100 It is important 
to note that, as the South Ossetian forces (which included volunteer militias) were not 
under the overall or effective control of Georgia or Russia, their actions could 




                                                
94 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1) 64-65. 
95 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1) 111; Human Rights Watch A Dying Practice: Use of 
Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008 (2009) 2, available at 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/georgia0409webwcover_0.pdf, accessed on 12 February 2016. 
96 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1) 2. 
97 Ibid at 25. 
98 Ibid at 2. 
99 Ibid at 9-10. 
100 Ibid at 3 and 9-10. 
101 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1); the fact that they were not under the effective or 
overall control of Russia is crucial, as it indicates that acts committed by these non-state forces are not 
attributable to Russia. Jurisprudence confirming this can be found in ICTY Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, 
Appeals Chamber (15 July 1999) (hereafter Tadić Appeal) at para 131 (where the Court sets the 
threshold of ‘overall control’ which demands of the state for which the actions of another non-state 
actor may be attributed to wield ‘overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing 
the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity’ and in 
ICJ Nicaragua v United States of America (27 June 1986) at para 115, with an even more stringent 





SECTION III: APPLICABLE LAW 
 
A. ‘Armed conflict’ 
 
 In order for international humanitarian law to apply to a conflict, the threshold 
of an ‘armed conflict’ needs to be reached.102 This threshold varies depending on 
whether the conflict is international or not.103 In the conflict in question, as a result of 
the involvement of the Russian state armed forces, South Ossetian non-state forces as 
well as Georgian state armed forces, the qualification of the conflict as international 
or not is rather complex and can differ depending on the approach taken. Firstly, 
according to the jurisprudence of the ICTY, it is possible for a conflict to be 
characterised ‘at different times and places as either internal or international armed 
conflicts, or as a mixed internal-international armed conflict’; a non-international 
armed conflict (hereafter NIAC) could therefore exist alongside an international 
one.104 The effect of a ‘mixed approach’ is that an act of internationalisation of 
another state ‘only renders international the conflict between the parties belonging to 
[s]tates rather than all conflicts in the territory.’105 This approach is also one which is 
justified by the strict reading of the Geneva Conventions.106 After a thorough analysis 
of the situation in South Ossetia, Human Rights Watch chose this approach.107 The 
second approach is aimed at ensuring a greater respect of international humanitarian 
law due to the problems the lack of clarity of the first approach causes. Indeed, it is 
claimed that the first method results in artificially differentiating internal aspects of 
the conflict and that it is impractical, due to the fact that combatants would need to 
classify the conflict before attacking in order to know which rules apply to him or 
her.108 As a result, ‘a number of authorities have preferred to apply the full body of 
international humanitarian law to an entire territory that contains multiple conflicts of 
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international and internal origin.’109 They all advocate for a ‘blanket classification of 
[s]tate territories containing international and internal armed conflict.’110 This 
dissertation focuses on violations of the rules of international humanitarian law, and 
since the rules which are the object of this dissertation exist for both conflicts (as can 
be seen in section III.D), and that therefore the classification will not affect the 
conclusions made, this dissertation will not delve further on this point. Nonetheless, 
the threshold to satisfy the requirements of an armed conflict in both international 
armed conflicts (IACs) and NIACs will be examined. This way, the dissertation will 
show that  regardless of the approach taken, international humanitarian law applies. 
 
 According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1,111 an IAC exists where: 
there is a case of declared war; there is a resort to armed forces between two States 
(or more); there is a partial or total occupation of a state;112 or ‘peoples are fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination’.113 Furthermore, according to established 
jurisprudence ‘it may become international (or, depending upon the [approach taken] 
be international in character alongside a [NIAC]) if […] another [s]tate intervenes in 
that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if […] some of the participants in the 
internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other [s]tate.’114 In the case of NIACs, the 
threshold is much higher and varies depending on whether the rules one is trying to 
apply are customary or not. For rules of a customary nature, the accepted threshold 
set out by established jurisprudence115, is one of ‘protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within 
a [s]tate’.116 The threshold to apply in situations where the rules applied are not 
customary, is slightly higher still.117 However, since all of the rules which will be 
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analysed are also part of customary international humanitarian law (as will be 
established in section III.D), the customary threshold will be the only one pertinent in 
this dissertation. 
 
 This dissertation will first look at the outcome of the first approach mentioned 
above. In the conflict over South Ossetia, different attacks took place, some between 
Russian and Georgian state armed forces; as well as others between Georgian state 
armed forces and South-Ossetian non-state forces, including militia.118 It is important 
to assert that according to Human Rights Watch’s investigations, these non-state 
actors fulfil the criteria set out by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(hereafter ICRC) commentary of the Geneva Conventions in order to be considered a 
belligerent in an NIAC and to therefore be bound by international humanitarian law; 
namely to possess ‘an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, 
acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring 
respect for the Convention.’119 It is undeniable that the hostilities analysed in this 
case study fulfil both thresholds of armed conflicts. Indeed, it is clear from the facts 
mentioned in section II that in the case of attacks between Russian and Georgian state 
forces, there was clearly a resort to armed forces between two states; and that with 
regard to attacks involving Georgian forces and South Ossetian non-state forces, the 
threshold of protracted armed violence is also met.120 This was also the conclusion of 
the report conducted under Human Rights Watch.121 Consequently, according to the 
first method of classification, attacks between the Russian and Georgian armed forces 
should be regulated by international humanitarian law regarding IACs; while the law 
governing NIACs should apply to the hostilities between Georgian state armed forces 
and South-Ossetian non-state forces, since South Ossetia is recognised as part of 
Georgia.122 On the other hand, if the second approach is to be implemented, the 
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involvement of the Russian troops would have sufficed to classify the conflict as 
international and for the rules governing IACs to apply to all the attacks occurring in 




B.  National liberation conflicts 
 
 There are also arguments to classify this armed conflict as one of national 
liberation. Reasonings include the fact that South Ossetians, with the help of Russia, 
were trying to emancipate themselves from Georgia, using their right of self-
determination, while Georgia was wishing to keep its territorial integrity.124 This 
desire to emancipate is evidenced by South Ossetia’s declaration of independence in 
1992.125 It is also undeniable that the hostilities were strongly based on ethnicity.126 
These considerations are also relevant in jus in bello, as conflicts of national 
liberation are classified as IACs.127 However, according to the textual interpretation 
of this provision, as well as the commentary of Protocol 1, this article limits its 
application to scenarios of ‘colonial domination’, ‘alien occupation’ and ‘racist 
régimes’.128 ‘Alien occupation’ denotes ‘cases of partial or total occupation of a 
territory which has not yet been fully formed as a [s]tate’, and does not include 
situations when a part of a territory is occupied by another state.129 It is therefore 
difficult to classify the conflict over South Ossetia into this category. Furthermore, 
according to Aldrich, the polemical terms in this article render the provision 
practically a dead letter in our day and age.130 He emphasises the fact that Protocol 1 
‘never has been, and most certainly never will be, applicable to a war of national 
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liberation’ through the application of art 1(4) Protocol 1.131 Furthermore, as will be 
elucidated below in section III.D, the potential classification of this conflict as one of 
national liberation is rather obsolete in casu due to the fact that the rules which will 
be analysed, apply equally to both IACs and NIACs. 
 
 
C.  Occupied territories 
 
 Moreover, Russian troops entered, placed under their authority, and exercised 
effective control over certain areas of South Ossetia and Georgia without the consent 
of Georgia.132 Consequently, international humanitarian rules concerning occupied 
territory will apply for those areas.133 In the context of this dissertation the fact that 
certain areas were occupied is of little importance for three reasons. Firstly and most 
importantly, the attacks analysed in this dissertation occurred in cities and villages 
that had not yet been occupied.134  Secondly, this dissertation focuses on the use and 
choice of weapons, and the violations of humanitarian law which these aspects entail, 
namely the principles of discrimination and proportionality, and the prohibition on 
superfluous harm. The rules which concern exclusively situations of occupation135 are 
consequently not covered by the scope of this dissertation. Thirdly, the threshold of 
‘partial or total occupation of the territory’ mentioned in art 2 common Geneva 
Conventions whose effect is to make the rules governing IACs applicable, only refers 
to cases where ‘the occupation has taken place […] without hostilities’.136 It does not 
refer to situations like the one in casu where the threshold which elevates hostilities 
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to the status of an IAC have already been reached due to a resort to armed forces.137 
Even if one is to apply the first approach to classifying a conflict mentioned in 
section III.A which states that in one conflict, different laws can apply to different 
attacks, the provisions analysed in this dissertation, which cover the principles 




D.  International humanitarian law, and its regulation of the choice and use of 
weapons 
 
 As a result of the thresholds of an ‘armed conflict’ being met, international 
humanitarian law applies. It will bind state armed forces and non-state actors such as 
rebel groups and militias (given certain conditions are fulfilled, which are in casu 
fulfilled as mentioned above in section III.A).138 This law can be found in established 
customary  international law, in the texts of the Geneva Conventions as well as its 
Additional Protocols, the Hague Conventions and Regulations, and several other 
specific conventions. The laws concerning the means and methods of warfare have 
historically been regulated by Hague Law.139 The Geneva Conventions were 
themselves more focused on the protection of combatants which have been put hors 
de combat, and civilians. This being said, with the introduction of Protocol 1, means 
and methods of warfare were also treated in Geneva Law. Asides from the 
rudimentary obligations found in art 3 common Geneva Conventions and Protocol 2 
(only 15 articles which actually regulate the conduct of hostilities in NIACs), all of 
these rules predominantly concern IACs. Treaty law regarding NIACs is therefore 
skeletal as opposed to the detailed body of law governing IACs. 
 
 Georgia and Russia are both parties to Protocol 1. This Protocol regulates an 
ample part of the problems relating to the use and choice of weapons in IACs. It is 
also important to note that who started, the conflict and the reasoning behind it, has 
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no bearing on each party’s obligation to respect norms of international humanitarian 
law.140 These norms are not concerned with the jus ad bellum and apply equally to 
both parties.141 
 
 As seen above, a different set of rules applies to IACs and NIACs, and this is 
therefore another critical reason to classify the conflict before analysing potential 
violations of humanitarian law. However, this significance has been diminished, 
particularly in cases which involve violations akin to the ones in casu. Indeed, 
according to a comprehensive study conducted by the ICRC based on ten years of 
research,142 ‘most of the rules on the conduct of hostilities – initially designed to 
apply solely to [IACs] – are also applicable as customary rules in [NIACs]’.143 
Furthermore, jurisprudence as well as leading publicists also recognise that 
customary international humanitarian rules governing NIACs include the protection 
of civilians against indiscriminate attacks as well as the ‘prohibition of means of 
warfare proscribed in [IACs] and ban of certain methods of conducting hostilities.’144 
As a result, the provisions of Protocol 1 are now widely accepted to be reflective of 
customary international law applicable to both conflicts.145 The same can 
unfortunately not be said of the rules contained only in Hague law. A large part 
remains only applicable to IACs and has not yet become customary.146 In the 
examination of the choice and use of weapons by Georgia and Russia in the conflict 
over South Ossetia, the rules of international humanitarian law which are relevant are 
the ones concerning the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, the principle of 
proportionality and the prohibition of causing superfluous harm.147 All of these rules 
which will be analysed in this dissertation are simultaneously also a rule of customary 
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international humanitarian law that applies to IACs and NIACs;148 the classification 
of the conflict and the difference in treaty law will therefore not have an impact in 
their analyses. In order to give the most compelling case for each provision, the 
international customary rule counterpart, as codified by the ICRC, will also be 
presented.  
 
 Prior to the analysis of the rules governing the choice and use of weapons, it 
is important to note that weapons only become illegal once they are: prohibited by 
conventions that bind the parties, by international customary law, or if their use 
violates the principles of international humanitarian law. In casu, there is no 
convention applicable which prohibits the weapons which were employed. The 
Convention on Cluster Munitions is still not ratified by Georgia nor Russia. As 
mentioned in section I.D, this convention does not codify customary international 
law, nor have the provisions contained in it, including the one prohibiting the use of 
cluster munitions, become customary.149 These rules therefore do not bind Georgia 
nor Russia. Additionally, Protocol 5 on Explosive Remnants of War is solely aimed 
at the precautions needed to be undertaken by the parties following the attacks. As for 
Protocol 1 on Non-Detectable Fragments by X Rays, it targets glass or plastic 
fragments.150 The fragments produced by the weapons which will be analysed are 
made from metal and are big enough to be detected by the naked eye.151 These two 




SECTION IV: PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION 
 
A.  Violation concerning the choice of the weapon: 
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1. Article 51(4)(b) Protocol 1 and rule 11 and 12 of the ICRC’s codification of 
customary international humanitarian law, applicable to both IACs and NIACs:152 
‘Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: […] (b) those 
which employ a […] means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective’. 
 
 It is important to note, as a preliminary remark, that the term ‘means of 
combat’ used throughout Protocol 1 signifies ‘weapons’.153 The existence of weapons 
that are, by their nature, inherently indiscriminate is recognised by some academic 
scholars and by some countries.154 An example of this can be found in the Military 
Manual of Germany, which states that the use of flying bombs (for example rockets) 
is not admissible when they cannot be aimed precisely enough and that consequently 
the total effect of the weapon reaches the civilian population.155 According to 
Aldrich, examples of such weapons include ‘recent missiles like the Iraqi SCUDs that 
could be aimed at a very large area of land but not at any specific target within that 
area’.156 It is also important to note that according to the delegates in charge of 
drafting Protocol 1, the weapons primarily prohibited by this provision are missiles 
with no accurate aim.157 Conversely, another stance is the one of Blix, who supports 
the less nuanced claim that no weapon can be inherently indiscriminate.158 The 
jurisprudence of the ICJ supports this point of view. In its Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court refused to concede that 
nuclear weapons were inherently indiscriminate.159 It declared that ‘the Court 
considers that it does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with 
certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the 
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.’160 
Similarly, it could not claim that ‘the recourse to nuclear weapons would be illegal in 
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any circumstance owing to their inherent and total incompatibility with the law 
applicable in armed conflict.’161 If one is to follow this stance, it emanates from this 
reasoning that if this conclusion can be drawn for nuclear weapons, which have a 
much wider impact, both in time and space than multiple rocket-launchers, cluster 
munitions and rockets; and are much harder, and almost impossible to use in a 
discriminate manner, this conclusion can a fortiori also apply to these weapons. 
 
 While according to Blix and the ICJ the weapons analysed in this dissertation 
would not be inherently indiscriminate, those are opinions and are not binding when 
applying the law.162 Furthermore, they have been heavily contested. While these 
interpretations are to be kept in mind, in the next following part of this dissertation, 
conclusions  to the other convincing arguments will be presented. They also require a 
more thorough analysis of the case in question. These are also the arguments made by 
the majority of scholars, and their interpretations are also ones which are coherent 




α. Georgia’s attack using BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers on 
Tskhinvali and surrounding villages on the 7th and 8th of August 
 
 In addition to the more general statements mentioned above with regard to 
this provision, it is of great importance to state that according to the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR) in the case of Isayeva v 
Russia, the multiple rocket launcher BM-21 Grad, is an inherently indiscriminate 
weapon.164 
 
 In the case in question, Georgia used truck-mounted BM-21 Grad multiple 
rocket launchers.165 However, the exact type of the rockets put inside the launchers is 
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not mentioned in the report by Human Rights Watch. In any case, it is clear that it did 
not have cluster, incendiary or chemical warheads, but were most likely 122-mm 
standard Grad rockets.166 These rocket launchers are designed to propel 40 rockets in 
20 seconds.167 The margin of error probable for this type of weapon is greater than 90 
meters.168 The consequences of this margin of error are amplified by the fact that 
once those rockets are launched, they cover anywhere from 0.8 to 1 hectare.169 
Additionally, the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 
(hereafter IIFFMCG), established by the Council of the European Union, has found 
these weapons to have ‘uncontrollable effects’.170 These elements combined lead to 
the conclusion that this weapon was designed to cover large surfaces, without 
concerns regarding precision. Accordingly, the weapon destroyed many civilian 
buildings as well as entire streets and killed 34 people, a majority of them being 
civilians.171 
 
 In conclusion, the multiple rocket launcher BM-21 Grad is a weapon which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective. Therefore by choosing this 
weapon, Georgia violated this aspect of the principle of discrimination concerning the 
choice of the weapon. 
 
 
β. Cluster munitions 
 
 Accruing to what has already been stated concerning this article, it is argued 
that cluster munitions leaving fields of duds ‘incapable of distinguishing between 
combatants and noncombatants’ are, similarly to landmines, indiscriminate.172 
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Additionally, the ICTY judged that the cluster munition missile M-87 Orkan was an 
inherently indiscriminate weapon.173 The characteristics of the M-87s, which the 
Tribunal considered in order to come to this conclusion are: not only that they are 
unguided and non-precise missiles with a margin of error of 80m to 100m, but the 
area of the dispersion of the submunitions is approximately 2 hectares.174 Authors 
supporting the legality of cluster munitions suggest that they are not all a priori 
inherently indiscriminate.175 Accordingly, in the past it has been proven that it is 
possible for cluster munitions to be used precisely in order to destroy small, 
determined and specific military targets.176 Additionally, it has been argued that 
Military planners are able to, and have in the past, directed certain cluster munitions 
at military objectives.177 This argument is strengthened by the fact that 
‘improvements in technology are making cluster munitions even more accurate’ thus 
reducing the possibility of them accidentally hitting civilians.178 Advocates of this 
school of thought firmly assert that ‘it is impossible to objectively state that [all] 
cluster munitions are incapable of being directed at a military objective.’179 
 
 
γ. Attacks by Georgia on August 9th using M85 submunitions carried by 
Mk-4 cluster munition rockets 
 
 While the focus of the analysis of this attack is on the cluster munitions and 
not the multiple rocket launcher (as a similar analysis has been carried out in section 
IV.A.1.α for the use of the BM-21s), in order for the examination of the provisions to 
be complete, the fact that these weapons were propelled by a multiple rocket launcher 
will be taken into consideration. In casu, the cluster munitions were fired by a 
multiple rocket launcher Gradlar 160180 capable of firing 26 non-guided Mk-4 cluster 
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munition rockets, each containing 104 M85 submunitions in less than a minute.181  It 
can therefore be inferred that each individual cluster munition rocket was therefore 
not precise or accurate and could not be aimed at a specific military target, but simply 
towards a large surface area. Those weapons with no accurate aim are exactly the 
ones which are, according to the delegates in charge of drafting Protocol 1, targeted 
by this provision.182 Moreover, the argument that Georgia is advocating, that the 
villages in the surroundings of Gori district were not supposed to be hit,183 can be 
used against them in order to show that the weapon they used has a high margin of 
error. Combining this with the fact that M85 submunitions have an area of impact 
which can vary from 100m radius to 3 hectares184 and was therefore designed to 
affect large areas, one can conclude that the Mk-4s containing M85 submunitions 
fired by a multiple rocket launcher are inherently indiscriminate. This reasoning 
agrees with the jurisprudence of the ICTY.185 Additionally, these submunitions have 
some of the highest dud rates.186 Over 10 per cent of the submunitions do not explode 
straight away.187 As a result of this weapon with indiscriminate effects, entire towns 
and fields were bombed, causing at least 6 civilian deaths and more injured.188 Fields 
of duds were also left after the attack in such a way that at least 3 civilians were 
killed by them and 6 wounded.189 
 
 When applying these facts to the interpretation and application given to the 
provision, it is clear that Georgia violated this provision. 
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δ. Russia’s attack on August 12th on Gori city with an Iskander-M SS-26 
cluster munition missile 
 
 It is important to note that it is unknown by Human Rights Watch which 
submunitions were used in this missile.190 Conclusions can therefore be drawn about 
submunitions in general, about the missile that was carrying them and about their use, 
but not specifically about the submunitions used. 
 
 The cluster munition weapon used was an Iskander-M SS-26.191 This is a 
short-range missile which is fired from a truck.192 It was conceived in order to 
improve the precision of missiles containing cluster munitions and is recognised as 
the ‘most advanced missile of its kind.’193 This missile is guided, and ‘targets can be 
found not only by satellite and aircraft but also by a conventional intelligence 
centre.’194 Adding to the precision of the missile, the margin of error that it allows is 
only one of 5 to 7 meters.195 Moreover, this missile was designed to hit precise 
targets, of small sizes, as well as the ones in movement.196 Additionally, this weapon 
has been created in order to allow the least possible malfunctions, this includes a 
limitation to the existence of explosive remains as a result of the missile (the fact that 
no duds were reported by Human Rights Watch demonstrates that this weapon has a 
seemingly low dud rate).197 All of these elements lead to the conclusion that the 
Iskander-M SS-26 used in Gori city is a weapon which can be used in a way that the 
civilian population isn't reached, and that it is designed to be directed towards 
specific military objectives and to limit itself to their destruction. In this attack, while 
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unfortunately hitting some civilians, the weapon hit the principal command center for 
Georgian military operation was present.198 
 
 To conclude, due to the characteristic of the Iskander-M SS-26, by choosing 




2.  Article 51(4)(c) Protocol 1 and rule 11 and 12 of the ICRC’s codification of 
customary international humanitarian law, applicable to both IACs and NIACs:199 
‘Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: […] (c) those 
which employ a […] means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as 
required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to 
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.’ 
 
 In the opinion of respected scholars, including Breitegger, this prohibition 
addresses weapons and means of war, which, even if their conception allows them in 
principle to be directed at a specific military objective, become uncontrollable in time 
or in space, such as biological weapons.200 According to the commentary of Protocol 
1, this prohibition refers, inter alia, to anti-personnel mines that, in times of conflict 
and even once the hostilities are terminated, kill and injure human beings, regardless 
of their combatant or civilian status.201 An inherent problem with cluster munition 
weapons is the probability that some submunitions do not explode immediately, and 
thus kill after the attack has ceased. However, it has been argued that this prohibition 
is not violated in situations where a weapon, even if it ends up having indiscriminate 
effects, was designed in order to be able to be discriminate.202 
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α. Russia’s attack on August 12th on Gori city with an Iskander-M SS-26 
cluster munition missile 
 
 The weapon used by Russia was a cluster munition missile Iskander-M SS-
26.203 The submunitions contained in the missile were therefore designed to explode 
during the attack.204 In that way, they cannot be compared to landmines, who do not 
have the functionality to explode straight away but can remain unexploded for a 
significant amount of time. Moreover, this weapon was designed in a way to reduce 
the risk of explosive remains and therefore limits the damage inherent to cluster 
munitions.205 Factual elements, such as the fact that their presence was not 
reported,206 support the argument that the weapon is not one which is inherently 
indiscriminate in the sense of this provision. 
 
 Thus, the choice of this weapon by Russia does not violate this prohibition. 
 
 
B.  Violations concerning the use made of the weapon: 
 
1.  Article 51(4)(a) Protocol 1 and rule 11 and 12 of the ICRC’s codification of 
customary international humanitarian law, applicable to both IACs and NIACs:207 
‘Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which 
are not directed at a specific military objective’. 
 
 As opposed to the previous provisions analysed which concerned the choice 
of the weapon, this provision refers to the intentional use made of the weapon. By 
prohibiting attacks not directed at a specific military objective, art 51(4)(a) Protocol 1 
refers to a notion defined in art 52(2) Protocol 1. This same definition has also been 
established in customary international humanitarian law applicable to both IACs and 
NIACs.208 According to this article, military objectives are defined as ‘objects which 
                                                
203 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1) 111. 
204 Deák op cit (n194) 705. 
205 Ibid at 708. 
206 Human Rights Watch Up in Flames op cit (n1) 111-113. 
207 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck op cit (n138)  37-43. 





by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’.209 According to 
the writing of leading publicists, ‘location’ acknowledges that ‘an object may be a 
military objective simply because it is situated in an area that is a legitimate target’, 
and as long as the second condition is also fulfilled.210 Concerning the word ‘use’, it 
alludes to ‘the current function of the object.’211 As for an object whose ‘nature’ 
confers on it the status of a military objective, this pertains to an object’s ‘intrinsic 
character’.212 It is also critical to emphasise that these conditions must be fulfilled ‘in 
the circumstances ruling at the time’. The ratio legis behind this condition is to avoid 
a conclusion that each object, could, in abstracto, ‘in the wake of possible future 
developments, e.g., if used by enemy troops, become a military objective.’213 An 
exception to this condition is made for objects which by their ‘purpose’ contribute to 
military action. Indeed, this notion refers to the future use of the object that the 
enemy envisages to make, basing himself or herself on a reasonable presumption.214 
Worth noting is that even though the definition of a military objective provided by art 
52(2) is limited to objects, combatants are also clearly military objectives.215 The 
commentary of art 51 Protocol 1 specifies that the principal military objectives are: 
‘the armed forces, their members, installations, equipment and transports.’216 
Additionally, if an attack which was directed at a military objective, unfortunately 
causes casualties, it does not automatically make it indiscriminate and illegal.217 
However, the attack will have to respect the principle of proportionality. 
Furthermore, in case of doubt, an object which is usually dedicated to civilian 
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α. Georgia’s attack using BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers on 
Tskhinvali and surrounding villages on the 7th and 8th of August 
 
 While it is true that there were several military objectives in these villages 
such as such as South Ossetian forces, their firing positions in Khetagurovo, and their 
general quarters installed in a few houses in Tskhinvali and neighbouring villages,219 
Georgia still had to respect the principle of discrimination. During the attack, Georgia 
shelled in an incessant manner the town of Tskhinvali and the surrounding villages 
with BM-21 Grads.220 Moreover, it did so in an all-inclusive and extended manner 
which was not restricted to military objectives.221 Furthermore, there was a 
significant loss in civilian lives,222 and a large number of houses in the area were 
destroyed in consequence of the use of BM-21 Grads.223 It is therefore undeniable 
that these attacks were not directed at specific military objectives, but in the contrary, 
against entire villages without making distinctions. 
 
 Therefore, it must be concluded that Georgia violated this provision. 
 
 
β. Attacks by Georgia on August 9th using M85 submunitions carried by 
Mk-4 cluster munition rockets: 
 
 While Russian troops, equipment and armament by the Roki tunnel were 
bombarded, 9 villages in Gori district, where there were no Russian troops, were also 
hit by M85 submunitions contained in the 312 cluster munitions fired.224 
Furthermore, a large number of submunitions were found in crop fields with no 
military purpose.225 The fact that Georgia argued (with no probative evidence) that 
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the towns surrounding Gori district were hit by accident226 does not alter the reality 
that Georgia used this weapon in mass, and due to their large area of dispersion, over 
an extended territory.227 This leads to the irrefutable assertion that these weapons 
were not directed at a specific and determined military objective. 
 
 Consequently, Georgia violated this facet of the principle of discrimination. 
 
 
γ.  Russia’s attack on August 12th on Gori city with an Iskander-M SS-26 
cluster munition missile 
 
 In the case of the attack by Russia on Gori city, it is true that 6 civilians were 
killed and approximately 24 were injured.228 That being said, they were located by 
the principal command center for the Georgian military operation which was hit by 
the sole Iskander-M SS-26 missile fired.229 There is no doubt that this command 
center falls under the definition of an object which by its nature and purpose conveys 
an effective contribution to the military action of the enemy, and whose destruction 
clearly offers a definite military advantage. Thus, by hitting the command center, 
Russia was targeting a military objective. However, it so happened that, according to 
witnesses, the last Georgian soldiers had left the city the previous night.230 
Nonetheless, it is likely that Russia was not aware of their departure. Arguments 
supporting the lack of awareness of Russia concerning the absence of the troops 
include: the fact that the attack took place in the morning231, and therefore just a few 
hours after the last soldiers had left the city; the military importance of Gori city; the 
presence of the principal command center232; and the fact that the Georgian Defense 
Minister had previously ordered the Georgian troops to withdraw themselves to the 
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town of Gori.233 Furthermore, even if Russia was aware that nobody had remained in 
the command center, its destruction remains in casu a concrete and precise military 
objective for Russia. It is in fact a reasonable assumption to make, given the nature of 
the object, that Georgia had the intention of using it to its military advantage in the 
near future. This defines an object that is by its ‘purpose’ a military objective. This 
‘object’, by its nature and ‘envisaged future purpose’, therefore remains a military 
objective. The ratio legis behind this provision supports this statement. Accordingly, 
the principal center of command of the Georgian military operation is, by nature, the 
military objective par excellence.234 The limitation covered by the terms ‘in the 
circumstances ruling at the time’ was not envisaged for this type of military 
objective, but for objects that are not usually associated with a military advantage.235 
 
 It can be concluded from the elements above that even though the attack 
unfortunately resulted in civilian casualties, by attacking the principal Georgian 
command center of military operations, Russia attacked a specific military objective. 
There is therefore no violation of this article. 
 
 
δ. Attack by Russia on August 9th on the school in Gori city:  
 
 In addition to what has already been mentioned with regard to this provision, 
in the context of this specific attack it is crucial to note that even in situations where 
civilians or civilian objects are used to shield military objectives (which includes 
combatants), the latter will keep their status of ‘military objective’.236 The same logic 
is also applied in scenarios where there is no intention from the shields or the party to 
protect the military objectives, but military objectives are nonetheless located in the 
midst of civilians, or close to a civilian object.237 However, while in both situations 
their status allows for them to be legitimately attacked, the principle of 
proportionality will still need to be respected. There are, however, debates on how 
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this principle should apply in situations of human shields, this will be discussed in 
section V.A.1.ε. 
 
 The school in Gori city as well as the two buildings directly adjacent were hit 
by individual missiles fired by a plane, on the morning of the 9th of August.238 Both 
buildings by the school were hit by one missile each, and it is unclear whether just 
one or a few missiles hit the school itself.239 This dissertation will focus on the attack 
on the school as the other few strikes using seemingly precise missiles which hit 
other buildings were fired individually and they solely represent a problem of 
military objective and not one which requires an in depth analysis of the choice or use 
of weapons with regard to the principles of proportionality and discrimination. In this 
dissertation, it is inferred that the strikes fired were seemingly precise; this conclusion 
emanates from the fact that the military objective and the two buildings directly 
adjacent to it were hit.240 Furthermore, the fact that the two buildings were hit could 
have also been due to recklessness on the part of the attacker and not due to the 
characteristics of the weapon. It is also deduced that the weapons have an apparently 
small area of coverage. This conclusion stems from the fact that although more than a 
hundred people were located at the school and its yard, none were killed by the strike 
which landed on it, and that the damage was limited to the buildings hit.241 At the end 
of this section, after a thorough analysis of the attack directed solely on the school, I 
will conduct a brief analysis (due to the disparity of facts) on whether the conclusions 
are altered, if the strikes on the school and the two adjacent buildings are to be 
considered as a whole. 
 
 Approximately 100 Georgian military reservists were located inside the 
school or on its yard at the time of the attack.242 These combatants constitute 
evidently legitimate military objectives. According to Human Rights Watch, it is 
additionally possible that the school was used for military purposes.243 It would 
therefore become a legitimate military objective if Russia was aware of that fact. 
                                                










Furthermore, as stated above in section IV.B.1.δ, the presence of the civilians does 
not make the school or the combatants located there lose their status of military 
objectives. 
 
 There was therefore at least one military objective, and conceivably two, one 
of which located inside the other. The attack by Russia was therefore aimed at a 
military objective, and therefore respected this provision. 
 
 
2.  Article 51(4)(b) Protocol 1 and rule 11 and 12 of the ICRC’s codification of 
international humanitarian law applicable to both IACs and NIACs:244 
‘Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: [… ] (b) those 
which employ a method […]of combat which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective’. 
 
 This prohibition is aimed at methods of combat which have no regard towards 
the respect of the principle of discrimination and where the weapons are used in such 
a way that the principle could not be respected.245 Looking at jurisprudence on the 
matter, a judgment from the ICTY affirmed that the fact of throwing a few shells 
randomly in an inhabited zone, without taking ‘feasible precautions to verify the 
target of the attack’, equated to a method of attack which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective.246 Agreeing with this jurisprudence, Breitegger asserts 
that the elements to take into consideration in order to analyse whether the use made 
of a weapon could not have been aimed at a determined military objective are: the 
population in the town or village, the number of missiles fired, their precision, and 
the surface which they cover.247 Typical scenarios which would violate this 
prohibition are therefore attacks in populated towns with weapons which have a high 
margin of error and/or an important surface of impact; and that are either fired 
without targeting a specific place or used in high numbers.248 
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α. Georgia’s attack using BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers on 
Tskhinvali and surrounding villages on the 7th and 8th of August 
 
 In this attack, from the night of the 7th of August until the 8th of August 2008 
at some point during the day, the town of Tskhinvali and the surrounding villages 
were subjected to heavy shelling, in main part by the use of multiple rocket launchers 
BM-21 Grad.249 Many buildings and streets were completely destroyed by the 
shelling and 32 people were killed, a majority of them being civilians.250 There are a 
significant amount of elements which together create a powerful argument that 
Georgia violated the prohibition illustrated in art 51(4)(b) Protocol 1. Firstly, it is 
practically impossible to be able to limit an attack to a specific military objective 
when incessantly and heavily shelling multiple villages in their entirety. Secondly, 
this conclusion must be retained, a fortiori, due to characteristics of the BM-21 Grad 
mentioned in section IV.A.1.α. Thirdly, Tskhinvali was a populated town, in which 
the number of civilians was increased as a direct consequence of an announcement 
made by Georgia of a ceasefire, an announcement which enticed certain people to 
remain in the town.251 This consequently renders it even harder to distinguish 
between what is a military objective and what is not, and this a fortiori when 
weapons with these characteristics are used. The amount of civilian lives lost and 
damages to civilian objects lends credence to this conclusion. Given all the elements 
mentioned above, it is clear that attacking in such a method leads to an attack which 
could not have been discriminate. 
 
 To conclude, the heavy shelling and bombarding effectuated with BM-21 
Grads was incompatible with the prohibition of attacks that cannot be aimed towards 
a specific military objective. 
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β.  Attacks by Georgia on August 9th using M85 submunitions carried by 
Mk-4 cluster munition rockets 
 
 In addition to the general statements which have been established with regard 
to this provision, the report issued by Landmine Action has stated that due to their 
inherent characteristics, attacks with submunitions M85 are almost always 
indiscriminate when carried out close to civilians.252 
 
 In casu, Georgia fired 312 Mk-4 cluster munition rockets in the direction of 9 
inhabited towns as well as the Roki tunnel, and according to a witness Dzara road (a 
road which leads towns in South Ossetia to the Roki tunnel)253, using a Gladlar 160 
multiple rocket launcher254 which fires 26 rockets in less than 1 minute,255 each 
rocket containing a multitude of M85 submunitions that can reach a surface of impact 
of up to 3 hectares.256 The firing was therefore abundant, and due to the fact that the 
missiles were non-guided and fired by a multiple rocket launcher, they were not 
precise and not targeted at a specific military objective.257 On the contrary, the 
bombing was aimed at covering large areas. If Georgia was able to prove that those 
villages were never supposed to be hit,258 this would not affect the conclusion. 
Accordingly, this fact does not alter the way they were used, and the fact that the 
weapons were nonetheless directed in that general direction. Additionally, the tunnel 
and Dzara road were also filled by civilians fleeing conflict zones.259 
 
 This leads to the conclusion that Georgia’s use of the M85 submunitions 
could not be aimed at a specific military objective. This method of warfare therefore 
constitutes a violation by Georgia of art 51(4)(b) Protocol 1. 
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γ. Russia’s attack on August 12th on Gori city with an Iskander-M SS-26 
cluster munition missile 
 
 In the case of this attack, only one missile Iskander-M SS-26 was fired.260 
Furthermore, a large part of the population had already fled the town.261 Additionally, 
as established previously in section IV.A.1.δ, this missile can very well be used in a 
discriminate manner. This is due to the fact that it is guided, very precise and able to 
hit small and even moving targets.262 A conclusion can therefore be drawn that the 
problem as for the use of certain weapons in inhabited areas is not as prevalent in this 
specific case. Lastly, and perhaps amounts to the most convincing argument, is the 
fact that the only missile fired hit the Georgian command center of military 
operations.263 
 
 Consideration given to all these elements, the use made of the Iskander-M SS-




3.  Article 51(4)(c) Protocol 1 and rule 11 and 12 of the ICRC’s codification of 
international humanitarian law applicable to both IACs and NIACs264: 
‘Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: […] (c) those 
which employ a method […] of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as 
required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to 
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.’ 
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 The commentary on this provision by the ICRC stipulates that the ratio legis 
behind this provision is to target cases in which the use of certain means of combat 
can create a situation where they become ‘completely out of the control of those 
using them, causing significant losses among the civilian population and extensive 
damage to civilian objects’ such as an unlawful use of fire or poison.265 This 
interpretation has also received scholarly support.266 
 
 
α. Russia’s attack on August 12th on Gori city with an Iskander-M SS-26 
cluster munition missile 
 
 The weapon used was a submunitions missile.267 Its use is therefore not 
especially targeted by this article. Moreover, it is hard to see how its use could escape 
the control of Russia in a way similar to fire or poison, especially given the 
characteristics of the weapon mentioned in section IV.A.1.δ. While it is true that 
submunitions explode in all directions in a given area, the state using them is aware 
of the area of impact they will cover. Accordingly, the result and the outcome 
expected will not tend to vary much. The same can be said of the duds resulting from 
the attack. It cannot therefore be concluded that they lose complete control over it. 
 




4.  Article 51(5)(a) Protocol 1 and rule 13 of the ICRC’s codification of 
international humanitarian law applicable to both IACs and NIACs:268 ‘Among 
others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: (a) an 
attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military 
objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a 
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city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or 
civilian objects’. 
 
 The commentary of the ICRC elucidates that the words ‘clearly separated and 
distinct’ signify that this rule finds its full application when the distance separating 
two military objectives is sufficient to allow individual attacks.269 Furthermore, it also 
stipulates that the ratio legis behind this provision is to proscribe area bombardments, 
which have for objective to destroy ‘all life in a specific area and [raze] to the ground 
all buildings situated there.’270 
 
 
α. Georgia’s attack using BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers on 
Tskhinvali and surrounding villages on the 7th and 8th of August 
 
 In casu, the bombardment by BM-21 Grads was incessant during the entire 
night over the town of Tskhinvali and surrounding villages, without distinctions 
having been made between military objectives and civilians or civilian objects.271 
Indeed, while there was some military objectives in these towns such as South 
Ossetian forces, their defensive positions and general quarters installed in some 
civilian buildings in Tskhinvali and neighbouring villages,272 as well as their firing 
positions in Khetagurovo,273 they were separated enough that they could have been 
the subject of separate attacks. Indeed, some of them were even located in different 
villages. Furthermore, civilian buildings were often hit by many rockets fired by the 
BM-21 Grads, and certain areas of towns were completely destroyed.274 Additionally, 
34 deaths were counted during this attack, resulting on the most part from the use of 
Grad rockets, a significant part being civilian lives.275 Survivors only managed to 
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survive by hiding in basements.276 The IFFMCG also used the terminology of 
‘massive area bombardment’ to describe this attack.277  
 
 This type of bombardment can therefore be qualified as an area bombardment; 
and in any case Georgia made no efforts to attack the military objectives in 




β. Attacks by Georgia on August 9th using M85 submunitions carried by 
Mk-4 cluster munition rockets 
 
 In the conflict in question, the Human Rights Watch report claims that at least 
4 civilians were killed and 8 injured in the 9 villages hit by the M85s.278 However, 
the report states that it does not have any information about civilians killed 
elsewhere.279 If this does not necessarily lead to the recognition of an area 
bombardment, in the sense of a bombardment which has for aim to destruct all life 
and construction280; the literal interpretation of this article leads nevertheless to the 
conclusion that Georgia violated this prohibition. This can be deduced from the fact 
that 312 cluster munitions rockets were fired by a multiple rocket launcher, and 
covered entire villages.281 In these large bombarded surfaces, while the cluster 
munitions were also used on military objectives such as military equipment, 
personnel and armament by the Roki tunnel, its surroundings and possibly Dzara 
road, they also hit 9 inhabited villages, where they damaged buildings and fields.282 
Consequently, it can be inferred that by bombarding these villages and towns as well 
as the area of the Roki tunnel and possibly Dzara road in one attack, Georgia clearly 
treated several separate and distinct military objectives as one. Accordingly, it is 
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undeniable that Georgia could have separately attacked the military objectives found 
by the Roki tunnel, and the few military advantages possibly present in the villages, 
since the area covered included 9 entire villages. 
 
 If Georgia were to prove that only the area of the Roki tunnel was their target 
and that their attack was limited to that, it is conceivable that this attack would not 
violate this aspect of the principle of discrimination. However, Human Rights Watch 
was only able to gather information regarding the villages. The disparity of facts 
concerning the effect of the attack on the area of the Roki tunnel and Dzara road 
therefore does not allow the drawing of a definitive conclusion. An argument 
supporting Georgia would be that the area of the Roki tunnel does not constitute ‘a 
city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or 
civilian objects’. However, an opposing argument is that it could be classified as one 
‘containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects’ as a village, due to 
the fact that this is the only road which leads out of South Ossetia to North Ossetia, 
and that hundreds of civilians which were fleeing their villages were using it on the 
day of the attack.283  In any case, before one can conclude in favour of Georgia, two 
hurdles would need to be surpassed. Firstly, the troops, equipment and armament 
would need to be grouped together and not separated in a way to allow for distinct 
attacks. Secondly, it would be hard for Georgia to prove that the attack was solely 
directed at the troops, armament and equipment because nothing can change the fact 
that Georgia employed 312 cluster munition rockets which have a very high surface 
of dispersion and therefore bombed a significant area.284 
  
 According to the current situation and facts as they are shown, a violation by 
Georgia of this provision has been established. However, the conclusion could vary if 
Georgia proves that its attack was solely aimed towards the Roki tunnel. 
 
 
γ.  Russia’s attack on August 12th on Gori city with an Iskander-M SS-26 
cluster munition missile 
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 The fact that only one Iskander-M SS-26 missile, was fired285; a missile which 
was conceived to be directed at small targets286, suggests that the attack was not 
aimed at several military objectives. Indeed, the principal command centre for 
Georgian military operations was the military objective hit.287 This leads to the 
conclusion that according to the literal interpretation of this article, there is no 
violation. Moreover, on the total of inhabitants that were in the surroundings, 
including approximately forty civilians that were situated outside on the central 
square where the attack took place, 6 people were killed.288 Even if some civilian 
buildings were damaged (which is not reported in the report, but is conceivable), it 
would be hard to describe that as a ‘razing to the ground of all buildings’. Therefore, 
the conclusion can be drawn that there was also no area bombardment committed by 
Russia by the use of the Iskander-M SS-26.  
 




δ.  Attack by Russia on August 9th on the school in Gori city 
 
 In casu, the bombardment took place on a restrained area, namely a school 
that likely had become a military objective due to its military purpose, and had 
approximately 100 Georgian military reservists in its yard; and not over an extended 
surface where several military objectives were located and separated by a distance 
sufficient enough to allow individual attacks.289 Additionally, no casualties were 
reported from the attack on the school, and damages were only reported on the school 
and the two buildings adjacent to it.290  
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 It emanates from these facts that the conditions in order to recognise a 
violation of this article according to its literal interpretation are not fulfilled, and are a 
fortiori not satisfied in order to recognise an area bombardment. 
 
 
C.  General comments concerning the principle of discrimination with regard to 
the attack on the school 
 
 Provisions b and c of art 51(4) Protocol 1 are not analysed with regard to this 
attack. This is due to the fact that there is not enough information concerning the 
choice of the weapon and its use in order to be able to draw any conclusion as to 
these two aspects of the principle of discrimination. One can nonetheless imagine that 
the fact of firing a few strikes with seemingly precise missiles, and with an apparently 
small area of coverage, on a relatively small and specific surface,291 cannot be 
considered as an attack in which means or methods of warfare that cannot be aimed 
towards specific military objectives or whose effects cannot be limited in respect with 
the provisions of the Protocol 1 are used. In casu, the school hosting the reservists 
was hit,292 therefore supporting the argument that the weapon and the method used 




SECTION V: PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
 
A.  Violations concerning the use made of the weapon 
 
1.  Article 51(5)(b) Protocol 1, or rule 14 of the ICRC’s codification of 
customary international humanitarian law applicable to both IACs and NIACs:293 
‘Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as 
indiscriminate: […] (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
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civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.’ 
 
 This principle recognises that the loss of civilian lives and damages to civilian 
objects are results inherent to the reality of armed conflicts, and consequently that the 
existence of civilian collateral damage does not in every case result in an unlawful 
attack. It is crucial to emphasise the fact that the mere respect of the principle of 
proportionality does not by itself render the attack legal. The other principles of 
international law remain applicable and must equally be respected.294  In the analysis 
of this provision, one must look at the expected military advantage as well as the 
anticipated civilian collateral damage at the point of launching of the attack from the 
view point of a reasonable military commander and taking into consideration the 
information available to him/her.295 It cannot be done after the attack between the 
loss effectively caused and the military advantage effectively gained. It is therefore 
not an obligation of result. Furthermore, the ICRC adds that in case of uncertainty as 
to the element of proportionality of the attack, the interests of the civilian population 
must prevail.296 When calculating the proportionality of an attack, the factors that 
must be taken into consideration include, inter alia, the location and number of 
civilians, the precision of the weapons and its area of dispersion.297 Other factors 
which should be taken into consideration in the analysis of the proportionality, but 
that unfortunately cannot be accounted for in this analysis due to the disparity of facts 
include: ‘the terrain (landslides, floods etc.), […] weather conditions (visibility, wind 
etc.)’ as well as the technical skill of the person carrying out the attack.298 Moreover, 
art 50(3) Protocol 1 specifies that the fact that some non-civilians can be found 
amongst the civilian population does not deprive the latter of its protection. If the 
civilians are however intentionally used to shield the military objectives, this presents 
a different issue which is only relevant to the attack on the school and will therefore 
be mentioned in section V.A.1ε. 
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α.  Georgia’s attack using BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers on 
Tskhinvali and surrounding villages on the 7th and 8th of August 
 
 The military advantages that Georgia could have expected were mentioned in 
section IV.B.1.α. This being said, these military advantages can only be taken into 
consideration if Georgia was aware of their presence and their military use, which is 
not a given considering that a reason for choosing civilian buildings as general 
quarters could be to remain incognito. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch declared 
that ‘[i]t is also not clear […] to what extent the Georgian command had the 
necessary intelligence to establish the exact location of the South Ossetian forces at 
any given moment, in part because the forces were very mobile.’299 The exact extent 
of the military advantage which could have been anticipated by this attack is 
therefore unclear. 
 
 On the other hand, the amount of destruction of civilian objects and the loss in 
civilian lives which Georgia could have reasonably anticipated by using in an 
incessant manner means of war which are highly imprecise and affecting large areas 
which were populated,300 is very significant and arguably exceeds the military 
advantages mentioned above. This statement is supported by the report of Human 
Rights Watch stating that ‘Georgian military command was clearly aware of the 
presence of civilians in Tskhinvali and other areas subjected to artillery strikes’.301 
While it is true that the number of civilians at risk was lower due to the fact that some 
of them had been evacuated up to a few hours before the shelling,302 this element can 
only be taken into consideration if Georgia was aware of this. This is unlikely, 
especially due to the fact that President Saakashvili had declared in a public statement 
that ‘Georgia has unilaterally ceased fire in the current fighting with separatist rebels 
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in the region of South Ossetia’.303 Georgia could have reasonably expected that this 
statement would have influenced the civilians to remain, which was the case of a part 
of the civilian population.304 Consequently, 34 people were killed and even more 
injured, a significant amount of them being civilians, predominantly by the use of 
BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers.305  
 
 In conclusion, there is not enough information concerning what was expected 
from the attack to draw a clear conclusion. However, there are strong arguments to 
declare that even if Georgia was expecting all of the military advantages mentioned 
above, the choice and use of weapons in this attack would result in an attack which is 
not proportionate. These arguments are strengthened if some of the military 
advantages are not to be considered in the proportionality equation. 
 
 
β.  Cluster munitions 
 
 According to Breitegger, when examining the proportionality of an attack in 
which cluster munitions are used, it is important to look at their level of precision as 
well as their area of impact.306 Cluster munitions and the effect of their unexploded 
submunitions in the analysis of proportionality has been a discussed topic and 
diverging opinions exist. On one side there are scholars which claim that the loss in 
civilian lives and damage to civilian objects that need to be taken into consideration 
are also the ones which are indirect and in the long term, as long as they are 
foreseeable.307 Accordingly, scholars of this opinion, as well as several states, affirm 
that mission planners should consider in the analysis of proportionality, in light of  
known dud rates, ‘the fact that additional collateral damage is likely to occur in the 
future’.308 Furthermore, it is advanced that attacking parties should refrain from using 
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cluster munitions near populated areas unless the ‘direct military benefit clearly 
outweighs the likely collateral damage, both during and after the conflict.’309 
Opposing these views, Greenwood expressed the opinion that only the consequences 
on the civilian population in the short and middle term should be taken into 
consideration in the weighing of the proportionality; conversely, the consequences 
which develop in a further horizon, such as the effect of unexploded submunitions, 
should be dismissed from the calculation.310 The reasoning behind this opinion is that 
there are too many factors which influence the importance of their danger in the long 
term.311 These dangers can therefore not be reasonably examined and envisaged at the 
time of the attack.312 Other writers, including McCormack and Mtharu, claim that the 
consequences in the long term must also be taken into account but only in situations 
where the user of cluster munitions intentionally used this weapon in order for the 
duds to impede the access for civilians to certain areas.313 
 
 
γ.  Attacks by Georgia on August 9th using M85 submunitions carried by 
Mk-4 cluster munition rockets 
 
 By firing 312 non-guided cluster munitions rockets with the characteristics 
mentioned in section IV.A.1.γ using a multiple rocket launcher314 and therefore not 
assuring that each rocket was accurate and precise, but rather with the aim that they 
affect a large approximate area, in casu a surface including 9 villages,315 it can be 
expected that there would be a significant loss and damage to civilian lives and 
objects. In casu, at least 4 civilians were killed and 8 wounded in those villages, 
civilian buildings were hit and serious damage was caused to fields used for 
harvest.316 Additionally, Georgia was clearly aware of the mass movement of the 
population fleeing South Ossetia towards North Ossetia and that Dzara road, which 
leads to the Roki tunnel, was the only way there (an argument amongst others, which 
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points to this conclusion, is that Georgian forces were present on that road).317 By 
hitting those areas, Georgia could have therefore anticipated significant civilian 
collateral losses and damages. Human Rights Watch unfortunately has no information 
regarding civilians killed in those areas by M85s.318 
 
 With regard to the longer-term effects caused by duds, the fact that several 
submunitions would not explode and thus may cause damage in the future, was to be 
expected. In casu, duds caused the subsequent death of at least 3 civilians as well as 
injuring 6.319 Furthermore, according to a study on locations of strife in Lebanon, 
weapon experts and United Nations deminers have determined that M85s have 
‘unacceptably high dud rates’,320 one that surpasses 10 per cent.321 The probability of 
having unexploded submunitions is also heightened when the version of the M85 
used, is the one without a self-destruct mechanism.322 This was the case of the M85s 
used in casu.323 Consequently, when this weapon is used in mass, as in this attack, the 
rate of explosive remains is significant. According to the opinion of some states as 
well respected scholars, this should be taken into consideration in the analysis of the 
proportionality. However, even if one is to adopt the opposite opinion of the other 
scholars concerning duds, the incidental civilian loss and damage to expect from such 
an attack would remain significant, and thus should not alter the conclusions made. 
 
 Expected military objectives mentioned in the report, include military troops, 
equipment and armament which were located by the Roki tunnel.324 It must be noted 
that this attack had the effect of delaying the Russian advance into South Ossetia.325 
The information provided by the report is however limited to that, with no detailed 
facts regarding the attack, how many soldiers and equipment there were, and how 
many civilian casualties resulted from the M85s in South Ossetia (which includes 
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Roki tunnel and Dzara road).326 The report is also scanty with regard to the damage 
made in the towns in undisputed Georgian territory. 
 
 The lack of information therefore does not allow the drawing of a definitive 
conclusion with regard to whether the principle of proportionality was respected. 
That being said, the civilian collateral damage and loss that was to be anticipated 
when firing such a high number of cluster munition missiles over a large surface 
which included 9 villages, the area of the Roki tunnel, and plausibly Dzara road, is 
rather significant and it is likely that even if all of the military advantages mentioned 
in the report and above were anticipated, the attack would be disproportionate. 
 
 On the other hand, if Georgia could prove that it could not have reasonably 
expected that the submunitions would hit those villages,327 the expected civilian 
casualties and damage would be less prevalent in the calculation of the 
proportionality. Nonetheless, the fact that Georgia was certainly aware that civilians 
were in the area of the Roki tunnel,328 as well as the reality that a bombardment over 
a large surface area with little concern for precision was always the aim of the attack 
due to the way it was conducted and the weapons used, all support the notion that the 
the attack was disproportionate. Additionally, the large amount of duds capable of 
hitting civilians does not change in this scenario. However, due to the lack of 
information given by the report no clear conclusion can be drawn. 
 
 
δ.  Russia’s attack on August 12th on Gori city with an Iskander-M SS-26 
cluster munition missile 
 
 During the attack on Gori city, 6 civilians were killed, fewer than 24 were 
injured and certain buildings were damaged during the attack. However, the square 
which was affected by the cluster munition and where most of the victims were 
located was busier than it was supposed to be. This was due to a food distribution 
which was supposed to take place in the square where several citizens were waiting, 
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as well as the fact that a car accident in the square had attracted even more 
civilians.329 Russia could not have reasonably been aware of the latter, and was 
plausibly not aware of the former, and therefore, the analysis of proportionality must 
take into consideration the fact that fewer civilians should have been affected. 
Furthermore, the civilian population had already started to flee the city.330 
Considering the military importance of Gori city, Russia could have reasonably 
expected the city to have been vacated to a certain extent. Moreover, as indicated in 
section IV.B.1.γ, only one Iskander-M SS-26 was fired.331 The damage expected was 
therefore limited, and this a fortiori due to the characteristics of this missile 
mentioned in section IV.A.1.δ. All of these elements limit the problem of 
proportionality linked with the use of this type of weapon. 
 
 On the other hand, the principal command center for the Georgian military 
operation constitutes an undeniably significant military advantage which must have a 
substantial weight in the examination of proportionality. If Russia was not aware of 
the absence of the troops in the town,332 and reasonably expected their military 
presence in the center or in its immediate vicinity, this should also be taken into 
account in favour of Russia. As seen previously in section IV.B.1.γ, there are strong 
arguments militating for Russia’s reasonable expectation of their presence. 
Nevertheless, even if Russia was not expecting their presence, the military advantage 
expected from this attack would still have a considerable weight in the analysis. As 
established in section IV.B.1.γ, this is due to the military importance of the command 
center as a military objective, even when empty.  
 
 In conclusion, if Greenwood’s thesis is to be followed, and thus the effects of 
the duds are to be ignored in the equation, the respect for the principle of 
proportionality must be recognised, and this a fortiori due to the fact that only one 
missile was fired.333 Supposing that McCormack and Mtharu’s thesis is followed, and 
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a special focus is put on the intention made behind the use of cluster munitions, the 
respect for this principle should equally be acknowledged. Indeed, Russia did not use 
the Iskander-M SS-26 purposely for the effect the duds would have on civilians. This 
affirmation is supported by the fact that, to the contrary, Russia chose a cluster 
munition weapon which was allegedly the most improved of its kind with low 
chances of malfunction, and therefore smaller chances of duds as a result of missile 
malfunction.334 Furthermore, Russia used it in order to destroy the Georgian 
command center of the military operation.335 Even if one is to adopt the opposite 
stance advocated by several scholars, that in any case, the foreseeable effects in the 
long run, such as duds are to be considered in the calculation of proportionality, the 
balance of interests would remain in favour of Russia. This argument is reinforced by 
the report which does not mention the existence of duds.336 Furthermore, even if a 
few damages could have been expected from the duds, the destruction of the military 
objective remains such a big military advantage for Russia that the principle would 
still be respected. All of these elements support the claim that in this case, while it is 
true that attacks with cluster munitions should be avoided in towns, in casu, the 
expected military advantage of this attack distinctively outweighed the likely 
collateral damage both during and after the conflict. 
 
 Thus, Russia, did not violate this aspect of the principle of proportionality. 
 
 
ε.  Attack by Russia on August 9th on the school in Gori city 
 
 In situations where civilian objects are used to shield military objectives 
(which is prohibited by international humanitarian law),337 as a corollary of their 
direct contribution to the defence of the target, they will be granted an analogous 
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status to military objectives.338 However, damage to them should not be included on 
either side of the proportionality equation, and unless they ‘physically impede attack 
on the “intended target”’, they should not be attacked directly.339 However, human 
shields are treated differently. The use of human shields by a party is prohibited by 
art 51(8) Protocol 1 and rule 97 of the ICRC’s codification of customary international 
humanitarian law applicable to both IACs and NIACs,340 which states that ‘[t]he 
presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be 
used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular 
in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede 
military operations. The [p]arties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the 
civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military 
objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.’ The determining factor in 
reaching a violation of the prohibition to use human shields by a party is whether the 
attacked party had the deliberate intent to use them in order to safeguard its military 
objects or forces.341 The term ‘involuntary human shields’ covers situations in which 
the civilians used as shields are either unaware or not willing to actively frustrate 
enemy operations; this includes the two situations where the ‘use of human shields is 
passive, as when a party to the conflict takes advantage of their presence […] or 
active for example when the party directs them to a location they will shield’.342 In 
the case where the civilian has the intention to negatively impact the military effort of 
the enemy, they are categorised as voluntary human shields.343 The latter category is 
treated differently, due to their involvement in the hostilities.344 However, in the 
context of this dissertation, only regulations and scholarship debates concerning the 
former category are relevant. The following remarks will therefore refer to 
involuntary human shields. Unfortunately, while the law is clear on the obligations of 
the ‘attacked party’, the extent of the obligations of the ‘attacker’ when facing human 
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shields is not addressed in lex scripta and has thus become a controversial topic.345 In 
a current opposing prevailing practice,346 respected publicists, including Dinstein, 
Quéguiner and Rogers, are of the opinion that while the obligation of the attacking 
party to respect the principle of proportionality remains,347 it is necessary to take into 
consideration the fact that one of the parties has violated international humanitarian 
law by using human shields.348 According to them, the consequence to this is that ‘the 
actual test of excessive injury to civilians must be relaxed, [t]hat is to say, the 
appraisal whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military 
advantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that […] civilian casualties 
will be higher than usual.’349 The reasoning behind this argument is twofold. Firstly, 
this relaxation of the principle is needed in order to redress the balance, otherwise it 
would be ‘tilted in favour of the unscrupulous’.350 Secondly, it is argued that if this 
limitation to the equation of proportionality did not exist it would create a perverse 
incentive. Accordingly, it is possible that it could encourage a party to protect its 
military objects or forces with a high number of civilians with the objective that the 
attacking party will spare them, due to the fact that they would violate the principle of 
proportionality if they attack.351 In situations where the attacker has no regard for the 
respect of the principle of proportionality, this scenario would result in a high number 
of civilian casualties. This perverse incentive goes against the ratio legis of 
international humanitarian law which is to protect civilians. Nevertheless, this 
approach also has its downfalls, for example in a scenario where a state with the 
principle of proportionality in mind is planning an attack and would normally desist 
due to the large number of human shields, may be lawfully able to attack if the 
principle is relaxed. Authors such as Schmitt, in unison with the current prevalent 
practice believe on the other hand that the principle of proportionality should not be 
relaxed as a consequence to the enemy’s violation of the prohibition to use human 
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shields.352 They argue that ‘while humanitarian law takes account of the practicalities 
of warfare […], it is not intended nor designed to ensure a “fair fight”.’353 
Interestingly, their second argument is one that is also of concern to the opposing 
school of thought. According to this school of thought, ‘relaxing the principle of 
proportionality would have for effect to be inconsistent with the underlying purpose 
of that body of law - protection of those who are not engaged in the conflict.’354 
 
 In the case of this attack, there were about 100 Georgian combatants in the 
school.355 The presence of these combatants was most likely known by Russia, even 
more so due to the fact that they were in plain sight in the school yard, and the attack 
took place from an aircraft flying above, firing seemingly precise missiles.356 The 
expected military advantage gained from attacking them must therefore be accounted 
for in the calculation of proportionality.  With regard to the school itself, two possible 
scenarios can be envisioned. Firstly, it is possible that the school was used for 
military functions other than shielding the soldiers.357 Its destruction would therefore 
offer Russia a definite military advantage.  In this case it would be a military 
objective; and if Russia was aware of this status, it should be taken into account as 
‘expected military advantage’. The fact that hundreds of visible soldiers were 
gathered at the school358 creates a good argument that the school was used for 
military ends and that Russia was aware of it. However, Human Right Watch leaves 
this argument open and simply states that ‘it was possible that the school was deemed 
as being used for military purposes.’359 The second scenario is that the school was 
solely used as a shield to ‘protect’ the soldiers. In this case, if Russia was aware of 
the presence of soldiers at the school, which is more than likely, as explained above, 
it was legitimately allowed to attack it. The principle of proportionality with regard to 
the civilians would also need to be respected, but this will be analysed in a paragraph 
below. Accordingly, as the Georgian reservists were located on the school grounds,360 
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Russia could not attack one without touching the other. However, in this scenario, the 
damages done to the school could not be taken into consideration in the analysis of 
the proportionality. 
 
 Furthermore, it is also more than likely that Russia was not expecting the 
presence of civilians inside the school. This conclusion can be drawn from the fact 
that the attack took place on a Saturday, on the 9th of August 2008.361 This day was 
likely to have been a day of holiday for the school, or at least a day off, since it was 
the weekend. Russia could have therefore expected that students or staff were not 
attending the school. This hypothesis is supported by the report of Human Rights 
Watch which mentions solely the presence of civilians having taken refuge.362 
Moreover, if Russia was not anticipating the presence of the civilians taking refuge, 
which is very conceivable due to the fact that it is expected that civilians would not 
want to put themselves in danger by taking shelter in a place that is a military 
objective or that is in any case surrounded by soldiers which are legitimate targets, 
their presence could not be taken into consideration in the examination of 
proportionality. Additionally no civilian deaths were reported as a result of the 
missiles which hit the school.363 
 
 Moreover, it is highly likely that Georgia violated the prohibition to use 
civilians in order to create human shields with the aim of deterring Russia from firing 
on their military objectives. This conclusion stems from the fact that civilians were 
situated in the school because they had been told that they could find refuge there.364 
This information being so far from the truth (due to the school being a legitimate 
target and therefore an area where civilians are not safe), a simple error seems hard to 
admit. This misinformation is so blatant that Georgia’s intent to protect the 
combatants situated in the school, as well as potentially the school from an attack, by 
creating a situation where civilians were drawn to the place, is highly likely. 
Furthermore, the information gathered by Human Rights Watch points to the absence 
of any intention from the civilians taking refuge into the school to endanger 
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themselves in order to frustrate the enemy’s military actions.365 The existence of 
these involuntary ‘human shields’ should, according to certain scholars,366 relax the 
principle of proportionality in favour of Russia. 
 
 Given the above elements four conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, if Russia 
had been aware of the use of the school for military purposes as well as the presence 
of Georgian reservists in the school, and that according to the scanty facts, the few 
missiles fired seemed precise and with a relatively small surface of impact,367 it is to 
be concluded that Russia did not violate the principle of proportionality. Secondly, 
this deduction should also be retained even if the school had no military purpose 
besides the shielding of the Georgian reservists. Thirdly, Russia would still be 
respecting the principle of proportionality even if it had been aware of the presence of 
certain civilians in the school surrounded by approximately 100 Georgian 
reservists.368 Lastly, this conclusion should be accepted a fortiori if one is to follow 
the approach, albeit disputed, endorsed by Quéguiner, Dinstein and Rogers and that  
as a result of the violation of the prohibition of human shields by Georgia, the 
prohibition on human shields should be relaxed in favour of the Russia.  
 
In conclusion, in all of these cases, partly due to the weapon used, its usage and the 
significant military advantage that could be expected, the balance of the military 
interest versus collateral damage leans in favour of Russia. 
 
 
2.  Article 57(2)(a)(ii) Protocol 1, or rule 17 of the ICRC’s codification of 
customary international humanitarian law applicable to both IACs and NIACs:369 
‘With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: (a) those who 
plan or decide upon an attack shall: […] (ii) take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to 
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minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects’. 
 
 Even though this provision mentions the choice of the weapon as well as the 
methods of attack, it is clear from the wording and ratio legis of this provision that its 
analysis must be made in the context of the attack. This provision is not an obligation 
of result but a principle of precaution. ‘Feasible’ denotes ‘practically possible, taking 
into account all the circumstances at the time of the attack’.370 The commentary of 
this rule gives an example of a violation of this article: where a well-placed rocket is 
adequate to render a military objective useless, the state should not use a series of 
rockets fired without sufficient accuracy.371 The ICRC also indicates that the 
precision of the weapon must be taken into consideration.372 The analysis of rule 17 
of the ICRC’s codification of customary international humanitarian law applicable to 
both IACs and NIACs concretises this article somewhat by affirming that assailants 
must, inter alia, avoid attacks in populated areas if possible.373 Additionally, 
according to the commentary of the ICRC on this article, as well as Quéguiner, this 
part of the provision is largely aimed at precautions taken during the time of the 
attack.374 It therefore does not target, precautions which the party attacking must take 
prior to the attack, such as warning the population. 
 
 
α.  Georgia’s attack using BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers on 
Tskhinvali and surrounding villages on the 7th and 8th of August 
 
 As established in section IV.B.4.α, the military objectives situated in the area 
which was attacked could have been subject to unique attacks, by more precise 
weapons, thus reducing significantly the damage and loss caused to civilian objects 
and lives. This argument holds a fortiori due to the fact that the military objectives 
were situated in different towns.375 In casu, Georgia used BM-21 Grad multiple 
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rocket launchers with the characteristics mentioned in section IV.A.1.α, firing a high 
number of rockets over a dozen hours.376 These elements, fulfil the scenario 
mentioned above  in section V.A.2 as an example of a violation of this provision, 
namely to ‘use a series of rockets fired without sufficient accuracy’.  
 
 In conclusion, by choosing this weapon and attacking these towns and 
villages incessantly and without aiming at specific military objectives, Georgia did 
not take precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to 
minimising incidental civilian loss, injury and damage. Consequently, Georgia 
violated this aspect of the principle of proportionality. 
 
 
β.  Attacks by Georgia on August 9th using M85 submunitions carried by 
Mk-4 cluster munition rockets 
 
 In casu, this obligation was violated due to several factors. Firstly, as 
mentioned  in sections IV.A.1.γ and IV.B.1.β, imprecise cluster munition missiles 
with a large area of impact were used in towns and villages. Secondly, not only did 
Georgia use a weapon notorious for leaving an unacceptably high number of duds, 
but it used it in such a way that hundreds of explosive remnants would remain after 
the attack.377 Thirdly, by firing 312 cluster munition rockets towards 9 villages, as 
well as the Roki tunnel, and potentially Dzara road,378 and by not proceeding using 
single attacks targeting individual military objectives, it can be concluded that 
Georgia did not restrain itself to a limited damage, but attacked in a way that these 
cluster munitions would fall on civilians or civilian objects. This third point also 
holds even if Georgia manages to prove that those towns could not have reasonably 
been expected to be hit.379 Accordingly, in both scenarios civilians were present and 
Georgia effectuated this attack through a mass bombardment over a large area 
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without aiming with precision.380 Worth acknowledging is that the scenario 
mentioned in section I.B in which the use of cluster munitions could actually reduce 
collateral damage does not apply to a situation like this one where a lot of missiles 
were fired and where precision was not their main concern. 
 
 While the arguments above are individually convincing grounds to condemn 
Georgia for violating the obligation to take precautions to limit to the minimum 
damages to civilian objects and loss in civilian lives; when combined together, they 
lead to the irrefutable conclusion that Georgia violated this provision. 
 
 
γ.  Russia’s attack on August 12th on Gori city with an Iskander-M SS-26 
cluster munition missile 
 
 It is important to note that the attack using the Iskander-M SS-26 corresponds 
exactly to the scenario mentioned in section I.B where cluster munitions may actually 
reduce collateral damage, namely situations where 1 precise missile is used to target a 
specific military objective. According to the commentary of the ICRC, the fact that 
only one missile was fired381 also has significant weight on the analysis of this 
provision.382 All of these elements, as well as the specific characteristics of this 
weapon mentioned in section IV.A.1.δ, suggest that Russia took precautions in the 
choice and use of the weapon in order to limit the civilian collateral loss and damage. 
 




δ.  Attack by Russia on August 9th on the school in Gori city 
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 The use of seemingly precise missiles with a small area of impact383 supports 
the claim that the choice of means and methods of attack are aligned with the aim to 
minimise incidental civilian loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects. This argument is supported by the fact that no casualties were 
reported by Human Rights Watch from the direct attack on the school.384 Moreover, 
the fact that Russia attacked on that day (a Saturday)385 further strengthens the 
argument that Russia respected the obligation to reduce to a minimum incidental 
civilian loss and damage. 
 
 
3.  Overall analysis of the previous provisions under the assumption that the 
attack on the school is to be examined looking at the several strikes as a whole 
 
 First and foremost it is important to repeat what was mentioned in section  
IV.B.1.δ, namely that the strikes were fired individually and that from the scanty 
facts given by Human Rights Watch, they seemed precise and to affect a small area. 
While the information given by Human Rights Watch is not sufficient to draw 
conclusive deductions from a thorough analysis, this part will aim to show whether 
the conclusions drawn above will differ if these other strikes are to be included in the 
analysis of this attack. With regard to art 51(4)(a) Protocol 1, if the strikes were seen 
as individual attacks on the buildings then they would clearly violate this provision 
which states that an attack must be directed at a specific military objective. However, 
if they are to be seen as a whole it can indubitably be concluded that the attack was 
directed at a military objective (namely the school and the reservists located inside of 
it). Russia should not be held accountable for a violation of art 51(5)(a) Protocol 1 
either, as in both scenarios there are no several military objectives clearly separated 
and distinct. Indeed, the two other buildings hit were directly adjacent to the 
school.386 Additionally, an area bombardment cannot be retained when a few missiles 
with these characteristics are used. Pertaining to the first aspect of proportionality, 
namely the obligation set out in art 51(5)(b) Protocol 1, there are not enough details 
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to decipher what was to be expected from the attack, and if it could have been 
envisaged that they would hit these two buildings. It is also plausible that Russia 
could have reasonably expected that some civilians would have left the city due to the 
military importance of Gori city, and therefore anticipated less civilian casualties as a 
result of those strikes. Taking this into consideration as well as the fact that at least 
100 Georgian reservists were in the school yard and the possible military significance 
of the school,387 the above-mentioned characteristics of the weapon, and according to 
certain scholars the fact that human shields were used leads to the conclusion that the 
attack respects the principle of proportionality. This conclusion should be retained 
even if Russia could have reasonably expected an outcome similar to the one which 
actually took place where 5 civilians were killed, 18 injured and two buildings were 
damaged.388 Lastly, while the apparent characteristics of the weapon are inclined to 
minimise civilian collateral damage according to article 57(2)(a)(ii) Protocol 1, the 
pilot should have, if possible, been more careful to only aim the strikes at the school. 
If this was possible, Russia did not take all precautions in order to minimise the 




SECTION VI:  SUPERFLUOUS  HARM 
 
 Article 35(2) Protocol 1 and rule 70 of the ICRC's codification of customary 
international humanitarian law applicable to both IACs and NIACs389 set out the 
principle that all means and methods of combat ‘of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering’ are prohibited. While it is true that this rule also 
makes reference to methods of combat, respected scholars place this prohibition 
fundamentally in the field of the restriction of certain weapons.390 Superfluous harm 
can be defined as ‘harm that would not be justified by military utility, either because 
of the lack of even the slightest utility or because utility is considerably outweighed 
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by the suffering caused’.391 Consequently this harm would be ‘greater than that 
unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives.’392 A weapon which would 
provoke this type of harm would therefore be of nature to cause superfluous harm, as 
the sole legitimate objective in a war is to weaken the military forces of the other 
belligerent party.393 This objective would also be exceeded by the use of weapons 
which aggravate unnecessarily the suffering of men or women who are hors de 
combat, render their death inevitable, or cause harm which exceeds what is needed in 
order to render the combatants incapable of taking part in the hostilities.394 It follows 
that these means and methods of warfare that are prohibited against combatants are a 
fortiori prohibited against civilians.  
 
 According to the commentary of Protocol 1 by the ICRC, in order to 
determine whether there is a case of superfluous injury ‘it is necessary to weigh up 
the nature of the injury or the intensity of suffering on the one hand, against the 
“military necessity”, on the other hand’.395 While the prohibition rests fundamentally 
on the prohibition of certain weapons, when examining a possible violation of this 
principle, the military necessity of the weapon must therefore be considered.396 This 
necessarily implies an analysis of ‘how and why this weapon is used.’397 According 
to the leading publicist Blix, the incapacitating effect, the degree of harm the weapon 
inflicts, its probability of reaching the legitimate goal in war (which is to weaken the 
military advantage of the enemy), as well as its lethal capacity must be taken into 
consideration.398 
 
 Various legal sources and military manuals of different states mention as 
examples several weapons which have the effects prohibited by this principle. These 
include: projectiles which propel materials which are non-detectable by X-Ray, 
substances on projectiles which inflame injuries, bullets with irregular shapes that 
either flatten or spread once inside the body, laser weapons, poisoned projectiles, 
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flame throwers, chemical, biological, bacteriological and nuclear weapons.399 
However, they omit cluster munitions from the list.400 
 
 On the other hand, advocates of a cluster munitions ban claim that due to the 
multiplicity of the wounds that cluster munitions inflict on individuals, these weapons 
cause unnecessary suffering.401 This being said, one cannot look at the effects of 
cluster munitions in isolation, the effects of other ‘comparable weapons’ need to also 
be taken into account.402 Accordingly, according to Parks, an expert in the matter, 
‘[w]ounding by more than one projectile is extremely common on the battlefield due 
to the various lawful fragmentation munitions in use’, which include among others 
hand or rifle grenades and automatic arms fire.403 Furthermore, as mentioned in 
section I.B it has been argued that controlled cluster munitions induce less suffering 
than random fragmentation weapons.404 
 
 In casu, even if information is lacking in the report with regard to the missiles 
used on the school during the attack by Russia, it is clear that seemingly precise 
missiles that affect a limited surface405 and that arguably have a minor lethal capacity 
(this argument stems from the fact that the strike on the school itself caused no 
casualties even though more than a hundred people were on site)406 are not part of the 
list of weapons which cause superfluous harm. Their use is indeed justified by an 
important military utility and they do not cause unnecessary harm as opposed to the 
weapons mentioned in the writings of established scholars and military manuals. 
 
 The Iskander-M SS-26 should also not be recognised as a weapon causing 
superfluous harm for several reasons. Firstly, in order to violate the prohibition 
against superfluous harm, ‘the suffering inflicted by cluster munitions must outweigh 
the legitimate military necessity prompting their use.’407 However, as seen in section 
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I.A, cluster munition weapons have a significant military utility. Moreover, they are 
an excellent area weapon408, and ‘are perhaps the most effective weapons at stopping 
or slowing an enemy assault.’409 Some scholars even go as far as stating that they are 
‘one of the most effective and efficient weapons against a range of targets for armed 
forces.’410 Thirdly, as mentioned in section I.B, they may actually reduce collateral 
damage. The Iskander-M SS-26 cluster munition can therefore not be compared with 
the other weapons mentioned above, that either aggravate the pain or causes it 
unnecessarily with no military purpose. This weapon injures or kills in a way that is 
commonplace to the hostilities and was created for its military efficacy. It is to be 
concluded from these arguments that properly employed, cluster munitions such as 
the Iskander-M SS-26 do not cause superfluous harm.411 In casu only one cluster 
munition missile was fired and it hit a military objective.412 The way it was used, and 
why it was used, therefore respects the principle of military necessity. 
 
 Some of the reasoning used to not classify the Iskander-M SS-26 as a weapon 
which causes unnecessary suffering can however be turned and used as arguments as 
to why the missiles carrying M85s should be classified as a weapon which causes 
superfluous harm and therefore be prohibited. Firstly, the M85s have an intolerable 
rate of unexploded remains, namely 10 per cent,413 a portion of their suffering 
inflicted is therefore not justified by its military necessity. Secondly, the argument 
that they may reduce collateral damage applies to scenarios where just one cluster 
munition is fired accurately, like the Iskander-M SS-26, and not when they are 
employed in a way similar to the way Georgia used the M85s.414 The way they were 
used by Georgia actually exacerbates the possible civilian collateral damage. Lastly, 
their use by Georgia described in section IV.B.1.β, is not reconcilable with the 
principle of military necessity. 
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 As for the elements mentioned by certain scholars, such as the probability of 
reaching the military objective as well as lethal capacity; the fact that the particular 
cluster munition used by Russia was guided weapon with a very slim margin of error 
and designed to impact small targets, strengthens the conclusion that it did not violate 
this principle.415 On the other hand, these arguments and elements do not favour 
Georgia’s choice and use of weapons with regard to the respect of this provision. 
Indeed, the BM-21 Grads and the Mk-4 cluster munitions carrying M85 submunitions 
were weapons which, as seen in sections IV.A.1.α and IV.A.1.γ, are not accurate or 
precise. Moreover, they both have a wide surface of impact,416 which results in 
exacerbating the unnecessary damage that is caused as an effect of their lack of 
precision. Lastly, the harm that these weapons caused due to their characteristics and 
the way they were used would be ‘greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate 
military objectives’. 
 
 In conclusion, the use by Russia of a cluster munition missile of type 
Iskander-M SS-26 and the missile targeted at the school do not violate the prohibition 
to cause superfluous harm. On the other hand, arguments exist in disfavour of 
Georgia as for its use and choice of BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers and Mk-4 






 To conclude, there are arguments proving that Georgia had violated several 
rules on international humanitarian law. This state, through the choice of using BM-
21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, and Mk-4 cluster munition rockets containing 
M85 submunitions and its use in high numbers, over large areas while not aiming at 
specific objectives, not only violated the principle of discrimination under many 
                                                
415 Deák op cit (n194) 708-709; Military Today, available at http://www.military-
today.com/missiles/iskander.htm, accessed on 12 January 2016; Army Technology, available at 
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/iksander-system/, accessed on 26 January 2015. 
416 Military Today, available at http://www.military-today.com/artillery/grad.htm, accessed on 10 
September 2015; C King Associates Ltd, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment & Norwegian 





different aspects, but also the principle of proportionality. The analysis of these 
attacks also showed that, with regard to violations concerning the use and choice of 
weapons, the general principles of international humanitarian law were enough to 
prohibit Georgia from using these specific cluster munitions and to regulate its use.  
However, even with these prohibitions and regulations in place, Georgia did not 
respect them. It is possible that had Georgia been a party to the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions perhaps it would have created more incentive for it to respect those 
regulations. Additionally, certain arguments militate for the view that Georgia 
violated of the prohibition to use means and methods of warfare which cause 
superfluous harm. Concerning Russia, in its attacks in Gori city and on the school, it 
used either a precise missile containing cluster munitions or a precise rocket 
respectively. Furthermore, it used them in a restrained manner, in such a way that a 
violation of the principles of discrimination and proportionality must not be retained. 
The violation of the principle of the prohibition of superfluous harm must also not be 
reproached to Russia. The weapons used had a military necessity and did not exceed 
unnecessarily what was required in order to achieve it. However, in this scenario, the 
ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munition would have impacted the outcome 
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